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Abstract
The nature of E-commerce over the Internet has seen significant changes over the
years. Instead of companies selling items to consumers, consumers are increasingly
selling items to fellow consumers on a global-scale, and Internet auctions have been
the mechanism of choice in achieving this. In fact, auctioning allows the departure
from the fixed price model, which some regard as too rigid to be able to respond
swiftly to varying supply and demand fluctuations and changes, and the Internet
plays a pivotal role in catalysing the widespread acceptance of such a variable pricing
model on a global scale.
Internet auctions exhibit characteristics which are often not shared by conven-
tional auctions, e.g. auctions of fixed duration which encourage sniping (bidders
submit their bids moments before the close of an auction thereby preventing other
bidders from submitting counter-bids), the acceptance of multiple bids in a single
auction, and a maximum threshold whereby the auction will terminate at that price
point. Internet auctions have significantly greater scope incorporating algorithms
of increased complexity than conventional auction procedures. In this thesis, the
characteristics and properties of different Internet auction algorithms are modelled
mathematically based on a series of operational assumptions which characterise the
arrival rate of bids, as well as the distribution from which the private values of buyers
are sampled. From this, closed-form expressions of several key performance metrics
are determined, including the average selling price in a given auction, as well as the
average auction duration. In cases where a seller may be selling a commodity and
auctions repeat themselves with the same items for sale multiple times, the income
per unit time may also be quantified. Simulation experiments have been performed
and analysed in the context of the mathematical models, and reasonable agreements
are observed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Significance
The prevalence of the Internet has ushered in the near-frictionless dissemination of
data. In recent times, information flow is increasingly being monetised and dis-
tributed. Two trends can be observed: (i) the rise of goods and services purchased
over the Internet, as evident by a 24.9% increase in Internet sales by businesses in the
United Kingdom in 2009 alone (Office for National Statistics, 2010), and (ii) a marked
adoption of user-generated content, which sees half of the top ten internationally vis-
ited sites in 2010 as being related to user-generated content (Facebook, YouTube,
Wikipedia, Blogger, and Twitter, in order of site visits); notably five years ago there
were none (Alexa, 2010). The crossing-over of these two trends has resulted in the
augmentation of the E-commerce market by consumer-to-consumer (C2C) exchanges
of good and services, in many cases complementing, and in the others supplant-
ing, the pre-existing models of business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer
(B2C) exchanges. Instead of companies selling items to consumers, consumers are
now selling items among themselves, with a common mechanism of achieving this
being the auction. In fact, auctioning allows for a departure from the fixed price
model, which some regard as too rigid to be able to respond rapidly to supply and
demand fluctuations and changes. The pervasiveness and ubiquity of the Internet
has played a pivotal role in catalysing the widespread acceptance of such a variable
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pricing model.
The use of auctions as a means of resource allocation has existed since antiquity,
though becoming widespread only since the 1600’s. In fact, the first use of an auc-
tion was recorded by the first-known historian and, “Father of History”, Herodotus,
who described the auctioning of brides, from the fairest to the least fair, in Illyria
(modern day Bosnia and Herzegovina), to men who would become their husbands
(Herodotus, 2008). There were several known rules surrounding this mechanism: (i)
the process had to take place in a central location where all bids were observed, (ii)
all girls of marriageable age were to adhere to this custom and were not permitted
to find a husband outside this mechanism, and (iii) a man who bought a girl at the
auction had to give security in order to ensure that he would, in fact, make her his
wife. This historic observation highlights a few nuances of the auction mechanism—
namely, the transparency of bids, regularisation of the objects put up for auction,
and the contractual obligation between buyer and seller—from which parallels with
contemporary auctions can be drawn.
In the eighteenth century, various auction houses sprang up in order to provide
the service of selling assets that were generally considered illiquid, such as fine art,
rare books and antiques. Among the auction houses founded in the 1700’s, some
are still in existence today. These include Sotheby’s (1744), Christie’s (1766) and
Bonhams (1793). The largest of these is Christie’s, with its 2009 sales totalling £2.1
billion, while the most expensive painting sold—Jackson Pollock’s No.5, 1948 —was
auctioned by Sotheby’s in 2006 at a 2011 inflation-adjusted price of £93.8 million. In
more recent times, however, the public may be familiar with the concept of auctions
through the proliferation of eBay, an online auction website, although perhaps the
unconventional route that Google took in 2004 in allocating its initial public offering
via a Dutch auction had also given significant exposure to the auction mechanism.
Corporations often employ auctions in commodity allocation and these include, but
are not limited to, auctions of carbon credits, government bonds and sections of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
One way to view an auction is to regard it as the determination of bidders’ valua-
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tions by the seller with the hindrance of concealed information from bidders (Cowell,
2006). The value of the object being sold (or lot) can either be the same for everyone
and bids will vary according to the accuracy of the information a bidder holds, or
each bidder will have his own private valuation that is unaffected by the valuations
of those around him, whether known to him or not.
Five types of auctions are commonly addressed in literature:
1. The English auction involves public announcements of gradually increasing bids
until a single bidder remains, who pays for the lot at the price of the last bid.
This is also known as an open ascending price auction and the process is shown
in Figure 1-1.
2. The Dutch auction or reverse auction is the reverse of this and public announce-
ments of gradually decreasing bids are made until a single bidder remains, who
agrees to the exchange of services or goods at the price of the last bid. This
is also known as an open descending price auction and the process is shown in
Figure 1-2.
3. In the sealed-bid first-price auction, all bids are submitted in private and the
winner will pay the price that he had bid.
4. In the sealed-bid second-price auction or Vickrey auction, all bids are submitted
in private and the winner will pay the price that the “runner-up” had bid, i.e.
the next highest price. The process is shown in Figure 1-3.
Further to this, there are other independent properties that can be incorporated
when designing an auction (Parsons et al., 2011). These other properties are listed
below and a taxonomy of auctions is shown in Figure 1-4.
• Combinatorial: auctions that are combinatorial see multiple heterogeneous
goods auctioned together.
• Dimensionality: in a singularly-dimensional auction, the bid is completely
defined by the price of the lot, whereas in a many-dimensional auction, the bid
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Figure 1-1: English auction process.
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Figure 1-2: Reverse auction process.
may be a function of other attributes such as the timely delivery of the lot or
the length and amount of the insurance contract taken out on that lot.
• Sidedness: in a one-sided auction, bidders are either all sellers or all buyers.
In a two-sided auction, bids are submitted by both buyers and sellers and these
are matched by the auctioneer.
In fact, in auctions without time restrictions, the English and the sealed-bid
second-price auctions have been shown to be equivalent, while the Dutch and the
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Figure 1-3: Vickrey auction process.
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Figure 1-4: A taxonomy of auctions.
sealed-bid first-price auctions have also been shown to be equivalent. Furthermore,
this is generalised by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (shown in its entirety in
Theorem 1), which states that the seller will obtain the same revenue for all auc-
tions where: (i) the bidder with the highest bid always wins, (ii) the bidder with the
lowest bid expects zero surplus, (iii) all bidders are risk neutral, and (iv) the private
values of all bidders are drawn independently from the same distribution (Myerson,
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1981). By allowing sellers to equate the revenue generating power of different types of
auctions that may otherwise seem incomparable, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem
assists sellers in auction mechanism design. It is equally interesting to observe cases
where the Revenue Equivalence Theorem does not hold, e.g. if the private values of
bidders have been shown to be related and not independently drawn from the same
distribution, then it can be shown that the English auction yields a higher level of
revenue than the sealed-bid first-price auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
Theorem 1 The seller’s expected utility from a feasible auction mechanism is com-
pletely determined by the probability function p and the numbers Ui(p, x, ai) for all
i.
That is, once we know who gets the object in each possible situation (as specified
by p) and how much expected utility each bidder would get if his value estimate were at
its lowest possible level ai, then the seller’s expected utility from the auction does not
depend on the payment function x. Thus, for example, the seller must get the same
expected utility from any two auction mechanisms which have the properties that (1)
the object always goes to the bidder with the highest value estimate above to and (2)
every bidder would expect zero utility of his value estimate were at its lowest possible
level. If the bidders are symmetric and all ei = 0 and ai = 0, then the Dutch auctions
and progressive auctions studied in (Vickrey, 1961) both have these two properties, so
Vickrey’s equivalence results may be viewed as a corollary of our equation. However,
we shall see that Vickrey’s auctions are not in general optimal for the seller.
1.2 Aims and Objectives
This thesis aims to:
• Develop mathematical models and characterise the properties of different algo-
rithms that may be found in or may be built into Internet auction mechanisms,
basing these models on a series of operational assumptions including the arrival
rate of bids as well as the distribution from which the private values of buyers
are sampled.
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• Construct and run simulation experiments in the context of the mathematical
models, checking the validity of the mathematical models and using the same
assumptions.
• Scrape data from real-world auction websites and evaluate the extent to which
the mathematical model agrees with the data. The information derived from
this analysis is then used for parameter tuning in order to align the mathemat-
ical model with real-world data.
1.3 Contributions
Internet auctions exhibit characteristics which are not often shared with conventional
auctions, e.g. auctions of fixed duration which encourage sniping (whereby bidders
submit their bids moments before the close of an auction thereby preventing other
bidders from submitting counter-bids), the acceptance of multiple bids in a single
auction, and a maximum threshold whereby the auction will terminate at that price
point. Due to lack of regulation, the size of the market and the volume of bid-
ders and sellers, Internet auctions are better suited to incorporating algorithms of
increased complexity as opposed to the more established procedures at traditional
auction houses. For example, while eBay runs what essentially amounts to an En-
glish auction with a fixed duration, Swoopo runs what is known as a bidding fee
auction, where each bid incurs a fee and also extends the length of the auction by a
short amount (10–20 seconds).
This report provides a mathematical analysis of the characteristics and the prop-
erties of these different and unconventional types of Internet auctions using a series of
operational assumptions which characterise the arrival rate of bids, as well as the dis-
tribution from which the private values of buyers are sampled. From this, closed-form
expressions of several key performance metrics are determined, including the average
selling price in a given auction, as well as the average auction duration. In cases
where a seller may be selling a commodity and auctions repeat themselves with the
same items for sale multiple times, the income per unit time may also be quantified.
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Having such analysis will pave the way for the development of optimum and
dominant strategies on the part of both the buyer and the seller and an understanding
of how the sensitivity of different auction parameters affect the income and length of
an auction will aid auction design. A seller can decide the optimal type of auction
to host given his/her aims, with the performance of the chosen auction able to be
measured with different metrics in accordance to the specific aims.
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1.5 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, existing literature that addresses the current landscape of Internet
auctions is reviewed. This is divided into sections detailing Internet Auction Charac-
teristics and Applications, Internet Auction Behaviour, and the Stochastic Modelling
of Auction Processes.
Chapter 3 presents the algorithms that represent a variety of different Internet
auction mechanisms, analysing them in a stochastic framework. In particular, an
examination of the metrics, average auction duration and the average offer accepted,
are analysed for each auction mechanism.
Chapter 4 extends the theory in the previous chapter to additional types of auc-
tions found on the Internet. These include the Vickrey and reverse auction algorithms.
A similar approach is taken to that in Chapter 3, with the metrics, average auction
duration and the average offer accepted, being analysed for each auction mechanism.
Chapter 5 conducts surplus analysis and uses allocative efficiency in evaluating
how Internet auctions perform.
Chapter 6 conducts experimental validation for the algorithms detailed in Chap-
ters 3 and 4. Simulation experiments are performed, and comparisons are made
between the theoretical predictions and experimental observations. Furthermore,
real-world data scraped from eBay is used to compare with the model assumptions.
Chapter 7 deals with generalisations and extensions of the auction algorithms and
outlines the stochastic behaviour of private values and auction performance and the
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invariance of distribution on private values. In addition, generalisation of the results
to non-homogeneous Poisson bid arrival is undertaken.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 8 where a list of thesis achievements are given
in addition to details on the applications of the work that constitutes the thesis and
directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Internet auctions have begun to pervade large sections of the Internet economy and
there is an increasing amount of literature in this field. As a first step, we provide
a detailed comparison of the characteristics of Internet auctions which are often not
shared by conventional auctions in Table 2.1.
2.2 Internet Auction Characteristics and Applica-
tions
There has been substantial work done on auctions (see Figure 2-1), with several books
written on the topic (Cramton et al., 2006; Klemperer, 2004; Krishna, 2002; Milgrom,
2004). As a branch of game theory, auctions have been given the classification, D44,
by the Journal of Economic Literature. Though parallel in many ways, the volume of
literature on Internet auctions, however, is significantly less. It is important to draw
precise distinctions between traditional and Internet auctions in order to determine
which aspects of auction theory are applicable to which.
The Independent Private Values model is often associated with auctions (Parsons
et al., 2011). The characteristics of this model include the assumptions of privacy and
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Internet Auctions Conventional Auctions
Asynchronous; bidders need not be at the
same place at the same time
Synchronous
Global competition across national bound-
aries
No competition across national boundaries
Vickrey auctions dominant Tend to be first-price auctions
Can have absolute pre-determined end-
time
Pre-determined fixed end-time usually not
acceptable
Can run for days or weeks Usually run for no more than minutes or
hours
Concealed information; highest bid not
known
Often without concealed information —
highest bid known
Sniping No sniping
Buy-It-Now (BIN) option common Buy-It-Now option uncommon
Can support arbitrarily complex auction
rules and algorithms (e.g. Timeshift, Re-
ject without recall)
Unable to support such complexity
Seller Ratings; a key consideration Seller Ratings — largely unimportant
Large-scale shilling possible through sellers
systematically creating bidding accounts
Large-scale shilling not feasible
Timely submission of bids depends on net-
work speed and reliability
No such dependency
Bidders may participate in several auctions
simultaneously (via Desktops, Notebooks,
Mobile Phones etc.)
Usually not possible or with difficulty; not
the same degree of monitoring or control
Proxy bidding widely used Proxy bidding not widely used
Bidders need to create accounts first and
“reveal” their identity
Mystery bidders may sometimes just turn
up without revealing their identities
Statistically determined or event triggered
random end-time may be adopted
Random end-time usually not acceptable
Increasingly dominant as a mechanism for
different types of business and commercial
transactions
Auctions not extensively used for conven-
tional business and commercial transac-
tions and likely to remain so
Inspection of items not usually possible Inspection of items usually possible
Multiple channels of delivery Usually a single channel of delivery
Sellers can be a company A company selling normal items through
auctions is not cost-effective
Individuals can make systematic sales and
profits using auctions without needing
to set up a company (i.e. dedicated e-
commerce site)
Hard for individuals to do regular business
using only auctions
Table 2.1: Comparison between Internet auctions and conventional auctions.
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independence where the value of the commodity in question is private to the individual
buyers, and that different buyers do not know the values other buyers attach to the
commodity. In addition, these values are drawn from a common distribution which
is known to the buyers. In probabilistic terms, this essentially amounts to a series
of values which are independent and identically distributed. A common distribution
used is the uniform distribution (Katok and Kwasnica, 2008). In our subsequent
analysis, we shall follow the independent private values model using the uniform
distribution.
The online auction website, eBay, is a popular and recent implementation of the
auction mechanism. It is classed as a consumer-to-consumer (C2C) auction and it
runs open-bid second-price auctions that are of a fixed length. Due to its fixed
length, eBay auctions are susceptible to sniping, which see bidders submit their bids
moments before the close of an auction preventing other bidders from submitting
counter-bids (Ockenfels and Roth, 2006). While this is seen to be problematic, eBay
has always maintained the policy that a bidder should bid his private value. Since
the winner pays the second price, there is little reason for a bidder to shade his bid.
In order to counteract sniping, other online auction websites, such as Amazon, have
employed auctions with a soft close, automatically extending the length of the auction.
The investigation of different types of auction terminations has been undertaken in
Ockenfels and Roth (2002), where it is found that late bidders in eBay-style auctions
tend to be associated with highly experienced bidders, whereas those of the Amazon-
type tend to be relatively inexperienced bidders. In Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), it is
found that sniping often leads to winning, and it observes that many sellers tend to
set the starting bid price unrealistically low to stimulate bidder participation.
In Kaghashvili (2009), the mechanism of online timeshift auctions is proposed,
whereby auctions are qualitative modifications of the existing popular auctions with
items offered for a fixed time period. Conducting a standard timeshift auction com-
prises of several steps: i) the seller defines an auction length and a specific point
during the auction where the auction transitions to the timeshift interval before ter-
minating, ii) following the highest bidder who had placed at least a single bid before
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the transition to the timeshift interval, obtains the item. For B2C online auctions,
the analysis of their design, and the optimal design of online auction channel have
been studied in Bapna et al. (2002, 2003).
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Figure 2-1: Venn diagram classification of literature covered in this literature review.
The user of auctions as a market mechanism has also been studied in various
e-business and Web services contexts (Chen and Li, 2000; Ran, 2003; Huang, 2005),
often for allocating different types of resources with different policies for pricing. In
Huang (2005), a progressive resource allocation scheme which is the continuous ver-
sion of the generalised Vickrey auction is used, where the auction mechanism is built
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into the service sharing prototype so that users and auctioneers rely on the software
agents to exchange information in a distributed environment. More recent Internet
auction applications include Cloud computing resource allocation (Lin et al., 2010),
as typified by Amazon’s EC2 cloud computing service. The EC2 employs a continu-
ous double auction (CDA) for cloud server space, which they label “Spot Instances”,
and which has been analysed within a framework that simulates dynamic demand
through the peak/off-peak concept. In a recent patent (Mullins, 2008), Microsoft has
extended this use of double auctions to incorporate different types of decentralised
computing resources, which is partitioned into a two-tier pricing structure that ac-
counts for peak and off-peak traffic, with the discounted price of the latter reflecting
an increased risk of latency and network outage. In Lin et al. (2010), a dynamic auc-
tion mechanism for solving the allocation problem of computation capacity in cloud
computing is proposed, which makes use of second-price auctions to regulate com-
putational resource efficiency and to ensure a reasonable level of profit for the CSP
(Cloud Service Provider).
2.3 Internet Auction Behaviour
Studies of Internet auction bidding behaviour have been undertaken in Ockenfels and
Roth (2002, 2006); Wenyan and Bolivar (2008) In Wenyan and Bolivar (2008), differ-
ent properties of online auctions such as consumer surplus, sniping, bidding strategy
and their interactions are studied, and a significant correlation between sniping and
surplus ratios is found. It also examines the efficiency of online auctions, where Pareto
efficiency is used as the optimality criterion. In Ockenfels and Roth (2006), it is sug-
gested that the strategic advantages of sniping are eliminated or severely eroded in
auction mechanisms that apply an auction extension rule, and that there is noticeable
difference between sniping on eBay and Amazon in proportion to user experience.
Experimental studies of Internet auction behaviour have been undertaken in Lucking-
Reiley (1999); Vragov (2010); Katok and Kwasnica (2008). In Katok and Kwasnica
(2008), it concentrates on the Dutch auction and first-price sealed bid auction for-
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mats, using laboratory experiments and human subjects, where values are drawn from
the uniform distribution between 0 and 100, focusing primarily on the effect of clock
speed on seller’s revenue. In Vragov (2010), laboratory experiments with human sub-
jects are also conducted, and the operational efficiency of Internet auctions is studied.
Collusion behaviour such as shilling, in which the seller plays a part in the bidding
process, is studied in Kauffman and Wood (2005), where two types of shilling strate-
gies are examined, these deploy competitive bidding and reserve price mechanism and
each of these exhibits a characteristic pattern of behaviour. While an auction can
be defined as a market institution whereby offers are made only by the buyers, i.e.
bids, or only by the sellers, i.e. asks, a double auction is one where both buyers and
sellers are able to make offers (Friedman, 1993). Viewing the interlinking relationship
between bidders and sellers as networks is proposed in Dass and Reddy (2008), and
the competitions in auctions is investigated in Haruvy et al. (2008). Price variation
characteristics and consumer surplus are studied in Bapna et al. (2008); Jank et al.
(2006). The use of various types of curves for fitting price data for Internet auctions
have been proposed in Hyde et al. (2007), in which monotone splines and beta func-
tions are used. Empirical investigations of eBay auctions have also been undertaken
in Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) where the auction of coins is conducted. This makes
use of regression models to estimate the price of items and examines the influence of
seller ratings (which measures the reliability and services provided by the seller) on
the final price. It has also found that the effect of positive and negative ratings is not
symmetrical, with the latter having a much greater (adverse) influence on the price.
It also suggests that longer auctions tend to have a beneficial effect in achieving a
higher price. Moreover, in Dellarocas and Wood (2008), it was found that there is
a reluctance on the part of users to give negative feedbacks compared with giving
positive feedbacks. The K-means clustering algorithm has been employed in Bapna
et al. (2004) which classifies bidders into five categories based on factors such as entry
time, number of bids placed, and exit time. It also examines the use of automated
agents in carrying out bidding as well as the different experience levels of bidders. The
use of analogies from physics to study price movements have been applied in Hyde
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et al. (2007); Jank et al. (2008); Wang et al. (2008), which make use of the concepts
of price-velocity to characterise the dynamics of price changes and may subsequently
be exploited to produce forecasts.
2.4 Stochastic Modelling of Auction Processes
While the majority of the literature in the previous section considered auctions in
their entirety, it is useful to look at cases where the bids are separated from each
other and arrive following a certain distribution. A stochastic number of bidders is
studied in McAfee and McMillan (1987), where first-price sealed-bid auctions having
constant absolute risk aversion is analysed. As a result of the stochastic analysis,
the authors conclude that the seller should conceal the number of bids in order to
maximise the selling price. Stochastic models of bid arrival characteristics are studied
in Shmueli et al. (2007); Russo et al. (2008), where the so-called BARISTA (Bid
ARrivals InSTAges) model that makes use of non-homogeneous Poisson process is
proposed. The probabilistic and statistical properties of these models are analysed
and studied and the usefulness of these models for auction modelling is illustrated
and discussed.
An interesting Internet auction mechanism is proposed in Guo (2002). It considers
a seller who sets the lowest acceptable price for an item without revealing it, with
bidders arriving at different times with their bids. If a bid is lower than the set
lowest acceptable price, the seller immediately rejects the bid. However, if a bid is
higher than the set lowest acceptable price, then the seller faces the decision of either
accepting this bid or rejecting it and moving on to the next bidder, with the hope
of achieving a higher price. In the latter case, it is assumed that the rejected bid
disappears, never to return. Assuming that the seller is allowed to make a choice at
any time, the goal is to maximise the sellers expected return by choosing the best bid.
The situation is represented as an optimal stopping problem, and using techniques
from convex analysis, an explicit solution that yields a simple algorithm for the seller
is obtained.
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A stochastic approach to Internet auctions is given in Gelenbe (2009), where bid
arrivals also follow a Poisson process, with successive bids increasing in value and
the seller’s problem is to decide when it should accept a bid. The associated auction
algorithm is illustrated in Figure 2-2. After each bid, the seller waits for some random
decision time to determine whether to accept the offer. If a new bid arrives before
that time expires, then the process is repeated for this new bid. However, if a new bid
does not arrive before this time expires, then the seller accepts the current bid. If the
seller accepts the offer too quickly, then the price obtained may be low with respect to
the price that the seller would have received had he or she been more patient. On the
other hand, if the seller waits a long time before accepting an offer, a higher price may
be obtained but at the expense of wasting more time. After selling the good, the seller
rests for some random time before initiating a new auction. Characteristics of this
mechanism include decision time, rest time, and maximum bid value. These may be
adjusted, which will affect the auction duration. Similarly, in our study, we model the
bid arrivals as a Poisson process, and we follow the commonly adopted Independent
Private Values approach in which the buyers valuations are drawn independently
from a common distribution. Unlike the assumptions in Gelenbe (2009), however,
there are no overheads relating to decision time or rest time in our model, which
more realistically models real-life Internet auction mechanisms. We focus on the key
performance metrics of income per auction, and the duration of an auction, from
which we may determine the auction efficiency in terms of the income rate.
2.5 Agent-Mediated Auctions
Similar to conventional auctioning where human agents are often employed to serve
the interests of different parties of an auction, autonomous software agents are some-
times used to ensure that the requirements of buyers and sellers are satisfactorily
catered for. The use of trade agents for auctions is studied in Niu et al. (2009), and
in Yi and Siew (2001) software agent technology is used together with cryptographic
technology to enable the automation of online auction and develops a secure agent-
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Figure 2-2: Gelenbe auction algorithm.
mediated online auction framework (see Figure 2-3). In the proposed framework,
an online auctioneer generates an auction agent which acts as a mobile auctioneer
traversing a list of online bidders, asking and collecting bids of each round to the
online auctioneer. From the bid information so collected, the online auctioneer spec-
ifies a new minimum bid and sends out the software agent again. This process is
repeated until a minimum bid remains unchanged for three consecutive times, af-
ter which the auctioneer would broadcast the auction outcome. Generalisation of
such agent-mediated auctioning mechanism is indicated in Zambonelli et al. (2003)
in which both buyers and sellers also employ agents in a multi-agent environment to
achieve the overall application goal.
In Shehory and Sturm (2001), the implementation of an auction agent is de-
scribed, which participates and bids in web-based auctions on behalf of its user. The
user provides the agent with relevant details of product, price and bidding strategy
before activating the agent. After being activated, the agent enters the auction site,
locates the specific product, and monitors the site. The agent terminates its auction
activity either when its buying strategy requires withdrawal or when the auction fin-
ishes. In Das et al. (2001), a series of laboratory experiments that employs human
subjects to interact with software bidding agents in continuous double auctions are de-
scribed, and it is found that agents consistently obtain significantly larger gains from
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Figure 2-3: Illustration of the Agent-mediated online auction framework.
trade than their human counterparts, and that unexpected non-equilibrium trading
is observed in such systems. In Podobnik et al. (2006), mediation between service
requester’s agents and sellers service provider’s agents is studied, in which enables
provider agents to dynamically and autonomously advertise semantic descriptions of
available services through an auction model, called the Semantic Pay-Per-Click Agent
(SPPCA) auction. Requester agents then use the advertised services to discover ap-
propriate services. Then, information regarding the actual performance of service
providers is considered in conjunction with the prices bid by service provider’s agents
in the SPPCA auction before a final set of advertised services is then chosen and
proposed to the buyer agent as an answer to its request.
In Liu et al. (2003) a theory for auction agents forming part of a supply-chain man-
agement system combining concepts from auction theory, utility theory, and dynamic
programming is proposed. It employs results from utility theory to obtain the opti-
mal bidding strategy for risk-averse auction agents, both for first- and second-price
sealed-bid auctions in the symmetric independent private values model, in addition
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to using dynamic programming techniques to integrate the resulting auction agents
with a production-planning system. It also makes use of simulations in combining
the auction and production-planning system to obtain crude approximations of the
competitor’s valuations distributions of the auctioned item. This theory aims to pro-
vide a framework for building more powerful auction agents geared to highly complex
decision situations. In our study, the actual auction implementation mechanism may
or may not make use of agents to achieve the desired goal. Using agents, however,
may have the advantage of saving significant human efforts, especially when the auc-
tion takes place at times when the participating parties are unavailable. Similar to
the study Liu et al. (2003), we also make use of simulation experiments, but unlike
those, we also develop mathematical analysis of the different auction algorithms which
mostly leads to closed-form results.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of Auction Algorithms
This chapter contains the algorithms of a number of key auctions which differ from
one another in a significant way. In the analyses that follow, both in this current
chapter and the next, the different Internet auction algorithms may be categorised
according to their properties and characteristics:
1. First-price Forward Auctions with Fixed Duration (Algorithms I, III)
2. First-price Forward Auctions with Variable Duration (Algorithms II, IV, V)
3. Vickrey Auctions with Fixed Duration (Algorithms VI, VIII)
4. Vickrey Auctions with Variable Duration (Algorithms VII, IX, X)
5. Reverse Auctions with Fixed Duration (Algorithms XI, XIII)
6. Reverse Auctions with Variable Duration (Algorithms XII, XIV, XV)
Specifically, this chapter examines the cases of the fixed-time first-price forward
auction, which is similar to eBay, the first-price forward auction with variable dura-
tion, which is similar to the auctions that occur in auction houses such as Christie’s
and Sotheby’s, the cases where there is a maximum threshold termination, i.e. the
auction is terminated on reaching a specific bid level, and the case where the auction
is terminated on reaching a specific number of bids.
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The purpose of this chapter and the next is to deduce, given the simple set of
assumptions detailed below, the closed-form solutions to a number of key metrics
that can be used to compare the different auction types. These key metrics include
the average auction income as well as the average auction duration, and in cases
where possible, the average auction income per unit time.
While these closed form solutions are deduced using theoretical methods, Chapter
6 gathers real-world data from eBay auctions and tests the model with the collected
data, computing how closely they compare with each other, and in so doing, deter-
mining how well the theoretical formulas describe real-world behaviour.
Internet auction mechanisms take on a variety of forms. Many of them are forward
auctions, e.g. http://www.ebay.com, such as the English and Vickrey auctions, while
others may be reverse auctions, e.g. http://www.oltiby.com. There are auctions
that are of fixed duration, and there are those that allow an auction to terminate
prematurely when a high enough bid is received. Usually only a single bid is accepted
in each auction, but there also exist auctions that allow the acceptance of multiple
bids in an auction, e.g. Google AdWords.
As in Gelenbe (2009), bids are assumed to arrive over time in a Poisson manner
with rate λ, and that the bids { Qk } are ascending ordered values taken from the
uniform distribution over the interval (0, L). The latter is a commonly-used distri-
bution in auction analysis (Katok and Kwasnica, 2008). This property is further
discussed in Chapter 7. If there are N bids, these ordered values are denoted by
Q(1) < Q(2) < . . . < Q(N).
3.1 Auction Algorithm I: Fixed-time First-price
Forward Auction
A forward auction is an auction where buyers compete for lots and the price increases
as time passes. An example of this type of auction is eBay. In this algorithm,
the auction time is assumed to be fixed with duration T . Let N be the number of
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bids received, such that the largest bid Q(N) received over the time interval (0, T ) is
accepted. Each bid comes at a certain time t, with a bid value of R, from a user with
a specific bidder_id. A high value for T will produce a larger average accepted bid
but the duration of the auction will be longer. For practical and meaningful operation
of the auction, T should be significantly greater than the mean bid inter-arrival time,
1/λ, i.e. T  1/λ . At the close of the auction, the maximum bid Q(N) is accepted
(see Algorithm I).
Algorithm 1 Fixed-time first-price forward auction.
Require: T > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
clock ← 0
L← 0
while clock < T do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
clock ← clock + t
if clock < T and R > L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
end if
end while
end while
return L, accept id
From the results of order statistics (Barry C. Arnold et al., 2008), it can be shown
that the conditional income per auction is
E[Q(N)|Number of bids = N ] = NL
N + 1
. (3.1)
Since,
dE[Q(N)|Number of bids = N ]
dN
=
L
(N + 1)2
> 0,
as the number of bids N increases, the corresponding average income per auction will
also increase. Thus, when the bid arrival λ rate is high, the corresponding average
income per auction is likewise be expected to be high. To determine the average
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income E
[
Q(N)
]
, the condition on N is removed in Equation 3.1 using the Poisson
probabilities, i.e.
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
∞∑
N=1
NL
N + 1
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
∞∑
N=1
[
L− L
N + 1
]
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
∞∑
N=1
L× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
−
∞∑
N=1
L
N + 1
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
= L
(
1− e−λT
)
− Le
−λT
λT
∞∑
N=1
(λT )N+1
(N + 1)!
= L
(
1− e−λT
)
− Le
−λT
λT
(
eλT − 1− λT
)
. (3.2)
The term N = 0 is omitted above, since the income is zero upon N = 0. This
gives an average income per auction of
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
, (3.3)
and an income rate, or income per unit time, of
L
λT 2
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
. (3.4)
Figure 3-1 shows E
[
Q(N)
]
for different values of λ for L = 100, and T = 5, 10, 15.
In the case where T = 10, the increase in bid rate up to λ = 4 produces a rather
steep average auction income improvement. There seems to be a critical bid rate at
around λ = 6, above which the improvement in income becomes less pronounced.
Figure 3-2 shows E
[
Q(N)
]
/T , or the income rate, for different values of λ for
L = 100, and T = 5, 10, 15. In the case where T = 10, the increase in bid rate up
to λ = 1 produces a rather marked increase in auction income rate. There seems to
be a critical bid rate at around λ = 2, above which the increase in auction income
rate slows down. Moreover, the income rate drops as T increases, and the drop is
much more significant for smaller values of T : the drop is much greater from T = 5
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Figure 3-1: Average auction income of fixed-time first-price forward auction.
to T = 10 than from T = 10 to T = 15.
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Figure 3-2: Average auction income rate of fixed-time first-price forward auction.
Differentiating the auction income with respect to T , yields
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dT
=
L
λT 2
[
1− 1 + λT
eλT
]
.
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Since, λT > 0, and
eλT = 1 + λT +
(λT )2
2!
+
(λT )3
3!
+ . . . , (3.5)
the inequality (1 + λT ) < eλT holds, so that (1 + λT )/eλT < 1, and thus
[
1− 1 + λT
eλT
]
> 0.
Consequently,
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dT
> 0.
Thus, the auction income can be raised by increasing the auction duration. Sim-
ilarly, differentiating the auction income with respect to λ and by similar argument
using Equation 3.5,
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dλ
=
L
λ2T
[
1− 1 + λT
eλT
]
> 0.
Thus, the auction income can also be augmented by increasing the incoming rate
of bids.
3.2 Auction Algorithm II: Variable-time First-price
Forward Auction with Fixed Inactivity Win-
dow
Here, unlike Algorithm I, the auction will terminate when there is no bid arrival for
a fixed window of length α. On termination, the largest bid received will be accepted
(see Algorithm II).
The fixed inactivity window α may be adjusted, and for meaningful operation,
should not be significantly smaller than the mean bid inter-arrival time; a high value
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Algorithm 2 Variable-time first-price forward auction with fixed inactivity window.
Require: α > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
L← 0
loop
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
if t < α then
if R > L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
end if
else
return L, accept id
end if
end while
end loop
for α will produce a higher income but the auction will take longer. Unlike Algo-
rithm I, in which the auction duration is always bounded by T , here, it is possible
for the auction duration to go on for an indefinite period without a predictable end
point. In particular, if the average bid inter-arrival time 1/λ is significantly less than
α, i.e. α 1/λ, or λα 1, then there is little chance of having an interval of length
α without any arrival.
Let V (α) be the average waiting time from the beginning of the auction to the
(beginning of the) first occurrence of an inter-arrival time interval of greater than α
(i.e. excluding the time interval α itself). If the first arrival interval is less than α,
which happens with probability (1− e−λα), then the process effectively starts all over
again, except for any time penalty incurred, i.e.
V (α) =
∫ α
0
λte−λtdt+ (1− e−λα)V (α), (3.6)
where the first term represents the waiting time penalty for the first bid arrival av-
eraged over an inter-arrival interval of less than α. Solving for V (α), Equation 3.6
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becomes
V (α) = eλα
∫ α
0
λte−λtdt = eλα
[
1− e−λα(λα + 1)
λ
]
=
eλα − (λα + 1)
λ
This gives an average auction duration of τα = α + V (α), i.e.
τα =
eλα − 1
λ
. (3.7)
It can be seen that
dτα
dα
= eλα > 0,
so that τα grows as α increases. Figure 3-3 shows how τα varies with λ for α = 1, 2
and 3. It can be seen that τα increases relatively gradually for small values of λ, but
accelerates for large values. As the bid rate increases, there is reduced chance of a
no-bid interval occurring, which lengthens the auction, and the difference between
α = 1 and α = 3 also becomes more pronounced as λ→ 2.
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Figure 3-3: Average auction duration of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window.
To determine the average income E
[
Q(N)
]
, the condition on N in Equation 3.1
is removed. Unlike the fixed-time case where Poisson probabilities could be used,
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however, the probability mass function for N must first be determined. Denoting the
inter-arrival times by {Tk}, the number of bids is N if
T1 < α, T2 < α, . . . , TN < α, TN+1 ≥ α
Now, the probability of Tk < α is 1 − e−λα and the probability of TN+1 ≥ α is
e−λα, and since the sequence {Tk} is independent,
Pr[T1 < α, T2 < α, . . . , TN < α, TN+1 ≥ α] = (1− e−λα)N × e−λα. (3.8)
Thus,
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
∞∑
N=1
NL
N + 1
× (1− e−λα)Ne−λα
=
∞∑
N=1
[
L− L
N + 1
]
×
(
1− e−λα
)N
e−λα
=
∞∑
N=1
L
(
1− e−λα
)N
e−λα − Le
−λα
(1− e−λα)
∞∑
N=1
(
1− e−λα
)N+1
N + 1
= L
(
1− e−λα
)
− Le
−λα
(1− e−λα)
∞∑
N=1
(
1− e−λα
)N+1
N + 1
(3.9)
From the logarithmic series,
∞∑
N=1
θN
N
= − log(1− θ), (3.10)
and letting θ = 1− e−λα, from Equation 3.9,
E
[
Q(N)
]
= L
(
1− e−λα
)
− Le
−λα
1− e−λα

 ∞∑
N=1
(
1− e−λα
)N
N
− (1− e−λα)

= L
(
1− e−λα
)
− Le
−λα
1− e−λα
[
− log
(
e−λα
)
−
(
1− e−λα
)]
,
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which gives,
E
[
Q(N)
]
= L
(
1− e−λα
)
− L
eλα − 1
[
λα + e−λα − 1
]
.
On simplification,
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
eλα − 1
[
eλα − λα− 1
]
= L
[
1− λα
eλα − 1
]
. (3.11)
Combining with Equation 3.7, this becomes
E
[
Q(N)
]
= L
[
1− α
τα
]
. (3.12)
Figure 3-4 gives the average auction income as a function of λ for α = 1, 2 and 3.
From the graph, income differences tend to narrow for high values of α.
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Figure 3-4: Average auction income of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window.
Differentiating the auction income with respect to α, yields
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dα
=
λL
[
eλα(λα− 1) + 1
]
(eλα − 1)2 .
For the running of the auction to be meaningful, there must be an average of at
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least one bid arrival per interval of length α, i.e. λα ≥ 1, so that
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dα
=
λL
[
eλα(λα− 1) + 1
]
(eλα − 1)2 > 0.
This shows that the auction income can be increased by augmenting the inactivity
window, α. Similarly, differentiating the auction income with respect to λ and by
similar argument,
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dλ
=
αL
[
eλα(λα− 1) + 1
]
(eλα − 1)2 > 0.
Thus, the expected auction income would also increase with higher bid rate. Also,
it is interesting to compare the average auction duration of Algorithms 1 and 2.
Equating the two auction durations from Equation 3.7 yields
T =
eλα − 1
λ
.
Solving for α,
α =
loge(1 + λT )
λ
.
That is, when α equals the above value, then average auction durations of the two
algorithms are equal. For example, λ = 1 and T = 5 gives α = loge 6 = 1.8; λ = 1 and
T = 10 gives α = loge 11 = 2.4, and λ = 1 and T = 15 gives α = loge 16 = 2.8. Thus,
halving T would not require a proportionate reduction of α, since a relatively small
reduction of α may lead to a relatively substantial reduction in the overall average
auction duration. Conversely, a small increase in α may lead to a substantial increase
in the auction duration since the bid arrival occurring in the interval increase, ∆α,
may cause the entire auction process to be repeated all over again. As shown earlier,
the average auction income for Algorithm II is an increasing function of α, thus,
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whenever
α >
loge(1 + λT )
λ
, (3.13)
the average auction income of Algorithm II will be higher than that of Algorithm I.
3.3 Auction Algorithm III: Fixed-time First-price
Forward Auction with Maximum Threshold
Termination
Similar to Algorithm I, this auction has an added termination condition which allows
the auction to terminate before T time units have elapsed if a sufficiently high bid
is received. In some Internet auctions, there is a Buy-It-Now (BIN) option which
sets the price at an appropriately high level, such that the seller would be happy to
accept that bid and to terminate the auction immediately without letting it run its
full course. Let this maximum threshold be M , expressed in currency units, such that
whenever an arriving bid is greater or equal to M , the auction mechanism terminates
the auction immediately and the bid is accepted.
The threshold M set by the seller may be private to the seller or made public
to the bidders. The advantage of keeping it private is to allow the possibility of
receiving a bid higher than M . As shall be shown later, the average income from
receiving such a bid will fall between M and L. In the first case, the value M is not
disclosed to the bidders, and later, in the second case, the results are modified for the
Open Buy-It-Now (OBIN) case where M is made known to the bidders.
In the case where the value M is not revealed to the bidders, it shall be referred
to as the Closed Buy-It-Now (CBIN). In this dissertation, when neither OBIN or
CBIN is specifically indicated, Buy-It-Now (BIN) will generally refer to the Closed
Buy-It-Now.
Having a low maximum threshold M will allow the auction to terminate sooner.
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The lower the value of M , the shorter will be the auction duration. Setting M much
higher than E
[
Q(N))
]
will be unrealistic and will mean that early termination of the
auction before T is not likely. Setting M to be very small would mean that the first bid
arrival would likely be accepted, thereby triggering the immediate termination of the
auction. In general, the average auction duration is less than T (see Algorithm III).
Algorithm 3 Fixed-time first-price forward auction with maximum threshold termi-
nation.
Require: M > 0 and T > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
clock ← 0
L← 0
while clock < T do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
clock ← clock + t
if clock < T and R > L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
if L ≥M then
return L, accept id
end if
end if
end while
end while
return L, accept id
Denote by p, the probability that a given arrival meets the maximum threshold, i.e.
p = Pr[Bid ≥M ] = 1−M/L. The sub-stream, which meets the maximum threshold
requirement has arrival rate Λ = λp, is also a Poisson stream. Likewise, denote by
p′ the probability that a given arrival does not meet the maximum threshold, i.e.
p′ = Pr[Bid < M ] = M/L. Therefore, there are two Poisson arrival streams with
rates Λ = λp and Λ′ = λp′. The first arrival of the Λ sub-stream at time t before T
will terminate the auction at t immediately, which happens with probability Λe−Λtdt.
Averaging over all such arrivals before T gives
∫ T
0
Λte−Λtdt = Λ
[
1− e−ΛT (ΛT + 1)
Λ2
]
=
1− e−ΛT (ΛT + 1)
Λ
.
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On the other hand, if the first arrival from sub-stream Λ occurs after T , then
the auction duration will be T , which happens with probability e−ΛT . Therefore,
averaging over both possibilities, the mean auction duration E[TM ] for this case is
E [TM ] =
1− e−ΛT (ΛT + 1)
Λ
+ Te−ΛT =
1− e−ΛT
Λ
=
1− e−λT(1−ML )
λ
(
1− M
L
)
That is,
E [TM ] =
L− Le−λT(1−ML )
λ(L−M) . (3.14)
The limit E[TM ] → (1 − e−λT )/λ as M → 0 can be interpreted as: if there
is an arrival before T , which happens with probability 1 − e−λT , then the auction
lasts for a duration of 1/λ which is just the time of the first arrival, and this arrival
is immediately accepted because it must be greater than M . On the other hand,
E[TM ]→ T as M → L (which can be seen by application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule).
To show that the mean auction duration in this case is less than T , i.e. E [TM ] < T ,
then
(
1− e−ΛT
)
/Λ < T must be proven. This is equivalent to eΛT < 1 + ΛTeΛT and
upon expanding both sides, becomes 1 + ΛT + (ΛT )2/2! + . . . < 1 + ΛT + (ΛT )2 +
(ΛT )3/2!, which is seen to be true on a term-by-term comparison. Hence, E [TM ] < T .
Figure 3-5 plots the mean auction duration against the bid rate λ for values of
M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, for L = 100 and T = 10. As the bid rate increases, the
likelihood of receiving a bid higher than M also increases, and so the average auction
duration will drop. The gap between larger values of M (between M = 60 and
M = 80) tends to be greater than that of the smaller values (between M = 20 and
M = 40) when the bid rate approaches unity. This algorithm is able to reduce the
auction duration significantly for small to moderate values of M .
Also, differentiating E [TM ] with respect to M in Equation 3.14, gives
dE [TM ]
dM
=
λ
[
1− e−ΛT (1 + ΛT )
]
LΛ2
.
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Figure 3-5: Average auction duration of fixed-time first-price forward auction with
maximum threshold termination.
Since (1 + ΛT )/eΛT < 1, through using the expansion as in Equation 3.5, the
numerator of the above is positive, showing that
dE [TM ]
dM
=
λ
[
1− e−ΛT (1 + ΛT )
]
LΛ2
> 0.
Thus, increasing M will increase the duration of the auction. The auction income,
on the other hand, given that the auction terminates before T , can be shown to
be uniformly distributed over the interval (M,L). Since the auction income must
be greater than or equal to M , the auction income is a sample from the following
conditional density over the interval [M,L),
f(x|x ≥M) =

1
(L−M) for M ≤ x ≤ L,
0 elsewhere,
where (L−M)/L is the probability that the bid falls in the interval [M,L), and
the mean of this density is M + (L −M)/2 = (M + L)/2. Thus, the mean income
given the auction terminates before T is (M +L)/2, which happens with probability
1 − e−ΛT . There is, however, also a chance that none of the arriving bids attain the
maximum M , which happens with probability e−ΛT , and this then accepts the bid
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with average value MN/(N + 1), with N coming from the stream Λ′. Here, L is
replaced by M since none of the associated bids are allowed to exceed M . Therefore,
the average magnitude of the accepted bid E [QM ] operating under the given auction
termination rule, from Equation 3.3, is
E [QM ] =
(M + L)(1− e−ΛT )
2
+
Me−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
)
, (3.15)
which is plotted in Figure 3-6, for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100 and
T = 10.
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Figure 3-6: Average auction income of fixed-time first-price forward auction with
maximum threshold termination.
While the differences in auction income for different M values are about the same
for high bid rates, these differences tend to decline for high values of M when the
bid rate is low. When M → L; Λ → 0; Λ′ → λ then E [QM ] → LλT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
,
which is in agreement with the auction income in the non-threshold termination case.
In the Open Buy-It-Now (OBIN) situation, the threshold maximum M is made
known to the bidders. While a bidder may be willing to pay an amount higher than
M , he/she does not need to do so, as paying M is sufficient to secure the good. Hence,
the above average auction income is reduced to, on replacing (M +L)/2 by M in the
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first income component,
E [QM ] = M
(
1− e−ΛT
)
+
Me−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
)
.
which on simplification gives
E [QM ] = M
1 + e−ΛT
(
e−Λ
′T − 1
)
Λ′T
 , (3.16)
which is plotted in Figure 3-7 for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100 and T = 10.
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Figure 3-7: Average auction income of fixed-time first-price forward auction with
maximum threshold termination and Open Buy-It-Now (OBIN) termination.
3.4 Auction Algorithm IV: Variable-time First-price
Forward Auction with Fixed Inactivity Win-
dow and Maximum Threshold Termination
In this algorithm, the auction can terminate in two ways: either on the expiry of an
inactivity window or on receiving a sufficiently high bid (see Algorithm IV). As in the
previous section, the arrival stream contains two sub-streams: Λ = λp and Λ′ = λp′,
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with λ = Λ + Λ′, where the first sub-stream, Λ, meets the maximum threshold M ,
while the second sub-stream, Λ′, fails to meet the maximum threshold.
Algorithm 4 Variable-time first-price forward auction with fixed inactivity window
and maximum threshold termination.
Require: α > 0 and M > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
L← 0
loop
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
if t < α then
if R > L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
if L ≥M then
return L, accept id
end if
end if
else
return L, accept id
end if
end while
end loop
Start of auction
0
First arrival
Auction ends or process
restarts at this point with
probability p′
α
Auction time elapsed
Figure 3-8: Events in the first interval of length (0, α).
Focusing on the first interval of length (0, α) (see Figure 3-8), denote the average
auction duration by E [τM ]. Assuming there is an arrival in this interval, which has
probability 1− e−λα, its expected time of arrival is
∫ α
0
λte−λt
1− e−λαdt.
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The denominator 1 − e−λα is present since it is given that an arrival takes place
within (0, α), and so the conditional density,
g(t|t < α) =

λe−λt
1−e−λα for 0 < t < α,
0 for t ≥ α,
is used, and this conditional average is given by
∫ α
0
tg(t|t < α)dt = 1− e
−λα(λα + 1)
λ (1− e−λα) .
Consider this first arrival: if it comes from the Λ stream, then the auction termi-
nates immediately and no further auction time is incurred. If it comes from the Λ′
stream, however, which happens with probability p′, then further auction time will be
incurred and the process effectively restarts. That is, the additional average auction
time incurred will be p′E [τM ]. Thus, given there is an arrival in (0, α), the expected
auction duration is
1− e−λα(λα + 1)
λ (1− e−λα) + p
′E [τM ] ,
where the first term corresponds to the auction time incurred, irrespective of whether
it is an arrival from the Λ stream or an arrival from the Λ′ stream. Next, if there is no
arrival in this interval, then the auction duration is simply α (i.e. an empty auction),
which happens with probability e−λα.
Thus, averaging over the two possibilities of
1. having an arrival in the first interval of length (0, α), and
2. having no arrival in that interval,
it can be determined that
E [τM ] =
(
1− eλα
){1− e−λα(λα + 1)
λ (1− e−λα) + p
′E [τM ]
}
+ αe−λα.
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Solving for E [τM ] yields
E [τM ] =
1− e−λα
λ [p+ p′e−λα]
, (3.17)
which is plotted in Figure 3-9 for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100 and α = 3.
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Figure 3-9: Average auction duration of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination.
Note that as M → L, p′ → 1,
E [τM ] → 1− e
−λα
λe−λα
=
eλα − 1
λ
,
which is in agreement with Equation 3.7.
To show that E [τM ] < τα, Equation 3.17 is multiplied by e
λα both in the numer-
ator and in the denominator, yielding
E [τM ] =
eλα − 1
λ (p′ + peλα)
.
Since eλα > 1 (see Equation 3.5),
p′ + peλα > p′ + p = 1.
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Thus,
E [τM ] =
eλα − 1
λ (p′ + peλα)
<
eλα − 1
λ
,
giving E [τM ] < τα.
As for the average auction income, consider the final interval of length, (0, α). For
the auction to terminate, there are the two possibilities of
1. no bid arrival in this interval, which occurs with probability p1 = e
−λα, and
2. a bid arrival in this interval of a magnitude that falls between M and L, and
that this bid is the first bid to arrive in this interval—if this bid is not the
first bid to arrive, then this is no longer the final interval (let p2 denote the
probability of occurrence of this second possibility).
Focusing on the second possibility, let the inter-arrival time of the first sub-stream,
Λ, which meets the maximum threshold and whose arrival will terminate the auction
immediately, be X ∼ Λe−Λt, and the inter-arrival time of the second sub-stream, Λ′,
which fails to meet the maximum threshold and will allow the auction to continue,
be Y ∼ Λ′e−Λ′t. Thus, the probability p2 that the second probability occurs is:
p2 = Pr[X < α]× {Pr[X < Y < α] + Pr[Y ≥ α]} ,
where Pr[X < α] is the probability that a Λ-stream arrival occurs in the interval,
Pr[X < Y < α] is the probability that there is a Λ′-stream arrival also in the interval
but it occurs after the Λ′-stream arrival, and Pr[Y ≥ α] is the probability that there
is no Λ’-stream arrival in the interval. That is,
p2 =
(
1− e−Λα
) (
Pr[X < Y < α] + e−Λ
′α
)
.
With reference to Figure 3-10, to evaluate Pr[X < Y < α], let t ∈ (0, α) be
the arrival time of the Λ-stream, then the probability of this is Λe−Λtdt. Next, the
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probability of arrival of the Λ′-stream in the interval (t, α) is given by
∫ α
t
Λ′e−Λ
′tdt = e−Λ
′t − e−Λ′α.
0
First arrival of Λ-stream
t
First arrival of Λ′-stream
α
Figure 3-10: Events in the final interval of length (0, α).
Averaging over all t ∈ (0, α),
Pr[X < Y < α] =
∫ α
0
Λe−Λt
(
e−Λ
′t − e−Λ′α
)
dt
=
∫ α
0
Λe−(Λ+Λ
′)tdt−
∫ α
0
Λe−Λt
(
e−Λ
′α
)
dt
=
[ −Λ
Λ + Λ′
e−(Λ+Λ
′)t
]α
0
+ e−Λ
′α
[
e−Λt
]α
0
=
Λ
Λ + Λ′
(
1− e−(Λ+Λ′)α
)
+ e−Λ
′α
(
e−Λα − 1
)
=
Λ
Λ + Λ′
(
1− e−(Λ+Λ′)α
)
+
(
e−(Λ+Λ
′)α − e−Λ′α
)
=
(
1− M
L
+
M
L
e−λα
)
− e−Λ′α.
Upon simplification, the probability of occurrence of the second possibility p2 is
p2 =
(
1− e−Λα
) (
1− M
L
+
M
L
e−λα
)
.
Therefore, the auction income using Equation 3.11 replacing L by M and λ by
Λ′, and conditioning on these two possibilities becomes
E [Q′M ] =
p1
[
M
(
1− Λ′α
eΛ′α−1
)]
+ p2
(
M+L
2
)
p1 + p2
=
e−λα
[
M
(
1− Λ′α
eΛ′α−1
)]
+
(
1− e−Λα
) (
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
) (
M+L
2
)
e−λα + (1− e−Λα)
(
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
) ,(3.18)
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which is plotted in Figure 3-11 for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100 and α = 3.
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Figure 3-11: Average auction income of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination.
Note that as M → L; Λ→ 0; Λ′ → λ,
E [Q′M ] →
L
eλα − 1
(
eλα − λα− 1
)
,
which is in agreement with Equation 3.11. The corresponding Open Buy-It-Now
income is
E [Q′M ] =
e−λα
[
M
(
1− Λ′α
eΛ′α−1
)]
+M
(
1− e−Λα
) (
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
)
e−λα + (1− e−Λα)
(
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
) , (3.19)
which is plotted in Figure 3-12 for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100 and α = 3.
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Figure 3-12: Average auction income of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination and Open Buy-It-Now
(OBIN) termination.
3.5 Auction Algorithm V: Variable-time First-price
Forward Auction with Bid Enumeration Ter-
mination
In Algorithm I, it was mentioned that for effective auction operation, the condition,
that T  1/λ, should be met in order to ensure that there are enough bids in the
auction. Despite this, sometimes empty auctions can occur, where there are no bid
arrivals, and which can somewhat defeat the purpose of the auctioning mechanism.
For example, for Algorithm I, having no bid arrival in (0, T ) can occur with probability
e−λT , and for Algorithm II, the auction can close having no bid arrival with probability
e−λα. Thus, auction time is expended without achieving any income.
An algorithm that overcomes this empty auction problem is to terminate an auc-
tion only after a specified number of bids are received. If B is the required number of
bid arrivals, then the auction will terminate on the arrival of the B-th bid, and the
highest bid is chosen (see Algorithm V).
The average magnitude of the accepted bid, from results of order statistics (Barry
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Algorithm 5 First-price forward auction with bid enumeration termination.
Require: B > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
L← 0
while B > 0 do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
B ← B − 1
if R > L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
end if
end while
end while
return L, accept id
C. Arnold et al., 2008), is
E[Q(B)] =
BL
B + 1
, (3.20)
and is plotted in Figure 3-13 for B = 5, 10 and 15. Here, the bid rate does not
directly determine the auction income, but it has a direct impact on the duration of
the auction.
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Figure 3-13: Average auction income of variable-time first-price forward auction with
bid enumeration termination.
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The average auction duration in this case is simply the sum of B average inter-
arrival times, or B/λ, and is plotted in Figure 3-14 for B = 5, 10 and 15.
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Figure 3-14: Average auction duration of variable-time first-price forward auction
with bid enumeration termination.
Looking at duration, it is interesting to compare the average auction duration of
Algorithm V with those of Algorithms 1 and 2. If B/λ < T or B < λT , then the
average auction duration of Algorithm V will be shorter than that of Algorithm I.
For the average duration of Algorithm 5 to be shorter than that of Algorithm II, the
following condition must be fulfilled:
eλα − 1 > B,
giving
α >
loge(1 +B)
λ
.
For example, for B = 8 and λ = 0.5, for the average auction duration of Algo-
rithm V to be longer than that of Algorithm V, α must be larger than 4.4.
Looking at income, the average auction income of AAlgorithm V is an increasing
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function of B because
dE
[
Q(B)
]
dB
=
L
(B + 1)2
> 0.
For the average auction income of Algorithm V to be less than that of Algorithm I,
the following condition must be fulfilled:
BL
B + 1
<
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
,
giving
B <
λT
1− e−λT − 1.
Similarly, for the average auction income of Algorithm V to be less than that of
Algorithm II, the following condition must be fulfilled:
BL
B + 1
<
L
eλα − 1
(
eλα − λα− 1
)
,
giving
B <
eλα − 1
λα
− 1.
3.6 Results Summary
This chapter has studied the properties of five Internet auction algorithms exhibiting
different characteristics. Closed-form expressions are obtained for the average auction
duration, and average auction income, which are the key measures of Internet auction
performance. These results are summarised in Table 3.1.
For the fixed-time first-price forward auction, as expected, an increase in the
number of bids results in a corresponding increase in average auction income. The
size of the average bid rate is a strong determinant of the amount of income obtained
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in the auction and an increase in bid rate up to a certain point produces a rather
marked increase in auction income rate, though there seems to be a critical bid rate
above which the increase in auction income rate slows down.
For the variable-time first-price forward auction with fixed inactivity window, the
inactivity window, α, should not be significantly smaller than the mean bid inter-
arrival time, otherwise the auction will end without any or many bids. In the same
way, if it is much larger than the mean bid inter-arrival time, the auction may drag
on indefinitely with minimum impact on the income obtained in the auction.
For the fixed-time first-price forward auction with maximum threshold termina-
tion, similar to the Buy-It-Now (BIN) option in eBay, the threshold, M , needs to be
set carefully. Setting M much higher than average auction income will mean that
early termination of the auction before T is unlikely, while setting M to be very
small would mean that the first bid is likely to be accepted, which is the same as not
conducting an auction at all.
For the variable-time first-price forward auction with fixed inactivity window and
maximum threshold termination, varying the bid rate makes for very interesting re-
sults. As the bid rate increases, there is an interplay of two forces that affect the
duration of the auction: the auction duration lengthens as a result of an increased
probability that a bid arrives in the α interval; the auction duration shortens as the
probability of a bid hitting the maximum threshold is increased. This interplay can
be seen in Figure 3-9.
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Algorithm Average Auction Duration Average Offer Accepted Per Auction
I T L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
II e
λα−1
λ
L
eλα−1
[
eλα − λα− 1
]
III
L−Le−λT(1−
M
L )
λ(L−M)
(M+L)(1−e−ΛT )
2
+ Me
−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
)
[CBIN]
L−Le−λT(1−
M
L )
λ(L−M) M
(
1− e−ΛT
)
+ Me
−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
)
[OBIN]
IV
1−e−λα
λ[p+p′e−λα]
e−λα
[
M
(
1− Λ′α
eΛ
′α−1
)]
+(1−e−Λα)(1−ML +ML e−λα)(M+L2 )
e−λα+(1−e−Λα)(1−ML +ML e−λα)
[CBIN]
1−e−λα
λ[p+p′e−λα]
e−λα
[
M
(
1− Λ′α
eΛ
′α−1
)]
+M(1−e−Λα)(1−ML +ML e−λα)
e−λα+(1−e−Λα)(1−ML +ML e−λα)
[OBIN]
V B
λ
BL
B+1
Table 3.1: First-price forward auctions.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Vickrey and Reverse
Auction Algorithms
The previous chapter studied Internet auction algorithms which were first-price for-
ward auctions. As Internet auctions can take on a variety of forms, this chapter
studies other Internet auction algorithms which are prevalent on the Internet. There
are two main classes of algorithms: the first is related to Vickrey auctions, and the
second is related to reverse auctions.
Vickrey auctions are commonly used for the reason that it gives bidders an in-
centive to bid an item’s true value without needing to worry about overpaying. For
markets where liquidity is an issue, Vickrey auctions can be dangerous. An example
of this is demonstrated in a New Zealand spectrum auction, where there were only
to participants. While the first bid ran into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, the
second bid was a token bid in the tens of dollars. As this was a Vickrey auction, the
winner received a discount of four orders of magnitude, a far cry from the true value
that the buyer was willing to pay.
Reverse auctions are used for for obtaining low prices. This is often used when
supply outstrips demand. It is frequently used in procurement where a government or
private sector organisation wishes to obtain goods or services and the sellers compete
against each other in providing the goods or services at increasingly lower prices.
Note that this is different from a Dutch auction, which some also consider to be a
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reverse auction. In a Dutch auction, the auction still seeks to obtain as high a price
as possible and involves an auctioneer starting at a very high asking price that is
continually lowered until some bidder is willing to accept the offer. The advantage
of this is that auctions can happen very fast as it only takes a single bid to end the
auction; it plays off bidders’ fear of losing out and their drive towards a lower price.
4.1 Auction Algorithm VI: Fixed-time Vickrey For-
ward Auction
Various forms of Vickrey auctions, which can also be called second-price auctions, are
commonly found on the Internet. In eBay ’s system of proxy bidding, for example,
the auction winner does not pay the highest bid, but the value of the second-highest
bid plus a bid increment. Variations exist for the increment charged by the auction
mechanism which may be a fixed increment, or one that depends on the value of
the relevant bid. An advantage of Vickrey auctions is that it gives bidders an incen-
tive to bid an item’s true value without needing to worry about overpaying. As in
Algorithm I, the auction time here is fixed with duration T . For effective auction op-
eration, one would need to have at least two bids, and thus T should be significantly
greater than twice the mean inter-arrival time 1/λ. If N is the number of bid arrivals
in the time interval (0, T ), then at the close of the auction, the auctioning mechanism
will pick the bidder of maximum bid Q(N) to be the winner while the amount the
winner pays will be Q(N−1) (see Algorithm VI).
From the results of order statistics (Barry C. Arnold et al., 2008), it can be shown
that the conditional income per auction, or the second-largest order statistic, is
E[Q(N−1)|Number of bids = N ] = (N − 1)L
N + 1
(4.1)
To remove the condition on N , three cases are considered:
1. N = 0. Here the income is zero.
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Algorithm 6 Fixed-time Vickrey forward auction.
Require: δ > 0 and T > 0
Ensure: L2 + δ > 0 and accept id1 6= null
accept id1← null
accept id2← null
clock ← 0
L1← 0
L2← 0
while clock < T do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
clock ← clock + t
if clock < T then
if R > L1 then
L2← L1
L1← R
accept id2← accept id1
accept id1← bidder id
else if R > L2 then
L2← R
accept id2← bidder id
end if
end if
end while
end while
return L2 + δ, accept id1
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2. N = 1. Here the income is zero plus an appropriate bid increment δo.
3. N ≥ 2. Here the Vickrey auction functions normally, and a bid increment δ
will apply.
Disregarding the bid increments temporarily, since Equation 4.1 gives zero for
N = 1, cases (ii) and (iii) can be combined and the equation can be summed from
N = 1, i.e.
E
[
Q(N−1)
]
=
∞∑
N=1
(N − 1)L
N + 1
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
∞∑
N=1
[
L− 2L
N + 1
]
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
∞∑
N=1
L× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
−
∞∑
N=1
2L
N + 1
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
.
Using the same technique as Equation 3.2,
E
[
Q(N−1)
]
= L
(
1− e−λT
)
− 2Le
−λT
λT
(
eλT − 1− λT
)
=
L
λT
(
λT + λTe−λT + 2e−λT − 2
)
. (4.2)
Thus, incorporating the bid increments of the last two cases above, results in an
income of
λTe−λT δo +
L
λT
(
λT + λTe−λT + 2e−λT − 2
)
+ δ, (4.3)
where the first term corresponds to the case N = 1. This is plotted in Figure 4-1, for
T = 5, 10 and 15, with L = 100 and δo = δ = 0.
It is useful to compare the average auction incomes of Algorithms 1 and 6. The
difference between the two average auction incomes is
E [∆1Q] = E
[
Q(N) −Q(N−1)
]
=
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− L
λT
(
λT + λTe−λT + 2e−λT − 2
)
.
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Figure 4-1: Average auction income of fixed-time Vickrey forward auction.
Simplifying gives
E [∆1Q] =
L
λT
[
1− e−λT (1 + λT )
]
. (4.4)
Since (1 + λT )/eλT < 1, which can be seen on expanding eλT for λT > 0, it can
be seen that E [∆1Q] is always greater than zero. As the average number of bids
becomes very small, however, on application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule on Equation 4.4, it
can be seen that
E [∆1Q]→ 0 as λT → 0
On the other hand, it is also interesting to see that as the average number of bids
becomes very large, the same limit is approached.
E [∆1Q]→ 0 as λT →∞
To see this, Equation 4.4 can be rewritten as
E [∆1Q] = L
[
1
λT
− e
−λT
λT
− e−λT
]
. (4.5)
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Thus, as λT →∞, the above approaches zero. The reason for this is that, as the
average number of bids becomes very large, the average auction income in both cases
will approach the same limit L such that there is very little difference between them,
i.e.
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
→ L as λT →∞
E
[
Q(N−1)
]
=
L
λT
(
λT + λTe−λT + 2e−λT − 2
)
→ L as λT →∞
A comparison of E
[
Q(N)
]
and E
[
Q(N−1)
]
is plotted in Figure 4-2, for T = 10,
with L = 100, T = 10 and δ0 = δ = 0. The difference between the two is significant
for low bid rates but narrows as the bid rate increases.
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Figure 4-2: Average auction income comparison between the fixed-time first-price
forward auction and the fixed-time Vickrey forward auction.
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4.2 Auction Algorithm VII: Variable-time Vickrey
Forward Auction with Fixed Inactivity Win-
dow
Here, like Algorithm II, the auction will terminate when there is no bid arrival for
a fixed window of length α. On termination, the second-largest bid received will be
accepted (see Algorithm VII).
Algorithm 7 Variable-time Vickrey forward auction with fixed inactivity window.
Require: α > 0 and δ > 0
Ensure: L2 + δ > 0 and accept id1 6= null
accept id1← null
accept id2← null
L1← 0
L2← 0
loop
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
if t < α then
if R > L1 then
L2← L1
L1← R
accept id2← accept id1
accept id1← bidder id
else if R > L2 then
L2← R
accept id2← bidder id
end if
else
return L2 + δ, accept id1
end if
end while
end loop
Ignoring the bid increments temporarily, the condition on N in Equation 4.1 is
removed in order to determine the average income E
[
Q(N−1)
]
. As in Algorithm II,
the following probabilities are used:
Pr[T1 < α, T2 < α, . . . , TN < α, TN+1 ≥ α] =
(
1− e−λα
)N × e−λα
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Summing from N = 1 as in the previous algorithm,
E
[
Q(N−1)
]
=
∞∑
N=1
(N − 1)L
N + 1
× (1− e−λα)Ne−λα
=
∞∑
N=1
[
L− 2L
N + 1
]
×
(
1− e−λα
)N
e−λα
=
∞∑
N=1
L
(
1− e−λα
)N
e−λα − 2Le
−λα
(1− e−λα)
∞∑
N=1
(
1− e−λα
)N+1
N + 1
= L
(
1− e−λα
)
− 2Le
−λα
(1− e−λα)
∞∑
N=1
(
1− e−λα
)N+1
N + 1
Using the logarithmic series given in Equation 3.10, this gives,
E
[
Q(N−1)
]
= L
(
1− e−λα
)
− 2L
eλα − 1
[
λα + e−λα − 1
]
.
On simplification and grouping terms, and on noting that (ex − e−x)/2 may be
simply written as sinh(x), we have
E
[
Q(N−1)
]
=
2L
eλα − 1 [sinhλα− λα] . (4.6)
Incorporating the bid increments, this yields an expected auction income of
(
1− e−λα
)
× e−λαδo + 2L
eλα − 1 [sinhλα− λα] + δ. (4.7)
Figure 4-3 shows the auction income for different values of λ for L = 100, α = 1, 2
and 3, δo = δ = 0. Note that the average auction income rises rather rapidly for small
values of λ, but stabilises and yields only slight improvement as the bid rate increases
beyond 2.
It is useful to compare the average auction incomes of Algorithms 2 and 7. The
difference between the two average auction incomes is
E [∆2Q] = E
[
Q(N) −Q(N−1)
]
=
L
eλα − 1
[
eλα − λα− 1
]
− 2L
eλα − 1 [sinhλα− λα] .
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Figure 4-3: Average auction income of variable-time Vickrey forward auction with
fixed inactivity window.
Simplifying gives
E [∆2Q] = E
[
Q(N) −Q(N−1)
]
=
L
eλα − 1
[
e−λα + λα− 1
]
. (4.8)
Since eλα > 1 and the numerator will be positive if
e−λα + λα− 1 > 0,
which is equivalent to
α >
1− e−λα
λ
,
and this inequality has been shown earlier in Section 3.3 to be valid. Thus,
E [∆2Q] > 0.
As the average number of bids becomes very small, however, on application of
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L’Hoˆpital’s rule on Equation 4.8, it can be seen that
E [∆2Q]→ 0.
On the other hand, as the average number of bids per window λα approaches
infinity, the first and third terms of Equation 4.8 tends toward zero. As for the
second term,
λα
eλα − 1 =
λα
λα + (λα)
2
2!
+ (λα)
3
3!
+ . . .
→ 0.
Thus, as λα→∞,
E [∆2Q]→ 0.
Therefore, as the number of bids in a window becomes large, there is little differ-
ence in auction income between the first-price and the corresponding Vickrey auctions.
This is plotted in Figure 4-4, for α = 2, with L = 100, and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-4: Average auction income comparison between the variable-time first-price
forward auction with fixed inactivity window and the variable-time Vickrey forward
auction with fixed inactivity window.
The auction duration for Algorithm VII is the same as that of Algorithm II and
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is given by Equation 3.7.
4.3 Auction Algorithm VIII: Fixed-time Vickrey
Forward Auction with Maximum Threshold
Termination
This is similar to Algorithm III, except that if the auction continues through to
completion, the accepted bid will be the second highest bid (see Algorithm VIII).
Algorithm 8 Fixed-time Vickrey forward auction with maximum threshold termi-
nation.
Require: δ > 0 and M > 0 and T > 0
Ensure: L2 + δ > 0 and accept id1 6= null
accept id1← null
accept id2← null
clock ← 0
L1← 0
L2← 0
while clock < T do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
clock ← clock + t
if clock < T then
if R > L1 then
L2← L1
L1← R
accept id2← accept id1
accept id1← bidder id
if L1 ≥M then
return L1, accept id1
end if
else if R > L2 then
L2← R
accept id2← bidder id
end if
end if
end while
end while
return L2 + δ, accept id1
The average auction duration here is the same as Algorithm III, and is given
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by Equation 3.14. The mean bid accepted given the auction terminates before T is
M+L
2
, which happens with probability
(
1− e−ΛT
)
. If none of the arriving bids attain
the maximum M , which happens with probability e−ΛT , the bid with average value
L(N − 1)/(N + 1) is accepted, with N here coming from the stream Λ′. Here, L is
replaced by M since none of the associated bids are allowed to exceed M . Therefore,
the average magnitude of the accepted bid E[QMv] operating under the given auction
termination rule, from Equation 4.2, is
E[QMv] =
(M + L)
(
1− e−ΛT
)
2
+
Me−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + Λ′Te−Λ
′T + 2e−Λ
′T − 2
)
, (4.9)
which is plotted in Figure 4-5, for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100, T = 10
and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-5: Average auction income of fixed-time Vickrey forward auction with max-
imum threshold termination.
The corresponding Open Buy-It-Now (OBIN) income is, on replacing (M + L)/2
by M in the first term,
E[QMv] = M
(
1− e−ΛT
)
+
Me−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + Λ′Te−Λ
′T + 2e−Λ
′T − 2
)
, (4.10)
which is plotted in Figure 4-6, for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100 and
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T = 10.
It is interesting to note that the curves on this graph cross-over. The reason for
this is that, for small M , the income is likely to be (M + L)/2 which basically is like
the first-price auction, while for large M , no bid exceeds M and hence the second
price would have to be accepted. Thus, the income drops from (M + L)/2 to second
price. Similar reasoning also applies to Figures 4-5, 4-6 and 4-8.
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Figure 4-6: Average auction income of fixed-time Vickrey forward auction with max-
imum threshold termination and Open Buy-It-Now (OBIN) termination.
The auction duration for Algorithm VIII is the same as that of Algorithm III and
is given by Equation 3.14.
4.4 Auction Algorithm IX: Variable-time Vickrey
Forward Auction with Fixed Inactivity Win-
dow and Maximum Threshold Termination
This algorithm is similar to Algorithm IV, except that if the auction continues through
to normal completion, the accepted bid will be the second-highest bid (see Algo-
rithm IX).
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Algorithm 9 Variable-time Vickrey forward auction with fixed inactivity window
and maximum threshold termination.
Require: α > 0 and δ > 0 and M > 0
Ensure: L2 + δ > 0 and accept id1 6= null
accept id1← null
accept id2← null
L1← 0
L2← 0
loop
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
if t < α then
if R > L1 then
L2← L1
L1← R
accept id2← accept id1
accept id1← bidder id
if L1 ≥M then
return L1, accept id1
end if
else if R > L2 then
L2← R
accept id2← bidder id
end if
else
return L2 + δ, accept id1
end if
end while
end loop
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As per the derivation for Algorithm IV, the mean accepted bid E[Q′Mv], averaging
over both termination possibilities, from Equation 4.6, is
E [Q′Mv] =
e−λα 2M
exp(Λ′α)−1 [sinh(Λ
′α)− Λ′α] +
(
1− e−Λα
) (
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
) (
M+L
2
)
e−λα + (1− e−Λα)
(
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
) ,(4.11)
which is plotted in Figure 4-7, for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100, α = 3
and δ0 = δ = 0.
0 1 2
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
Bid Rate
Income
M = 20.0
M = 40.0
M = 60.0
M = 80.0
Figure 4-7: Average auction income of variable-time Vickrey forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination.
In the Open Buy-It-Now (OBIN) situation, where M is made known to the bid-
ders, the average auction income is, from Equation 4.11 on replacing (M + L)/2 by
M in the second term,
E [Q′Mv] =
e−λα 2M
exp(Λ′α)−1 [sinh(Λ
′α)− Λ′α] +M
(
1− e−Λα
) (
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
)
e−λα + (1− e−Λα)
(
1− M
L
+ M
L
e−λα
) ,(4.12)
which is plotted in Figure 4-8, for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100, T = 10
and δ0 = δ = 0.
The auction duration for Algorithm IX is the same as that of Algorithm IV and
is given by Equation 3.17.
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Figure 4-8: Average auction income of variable-time Vickrey forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination and Buy-It-Now (BIN)
termination.
4.5 Auction Algorithm X: Vickrey Forward Auc-
tion with Bid Enumeration Termination
This is similar to Algorithm V, except that the second highest bid is accepted (see
Algorithm X)
The average magnitude of the accepted bid, from results of order statistics (Barry
C. Arnold et al., 2008), is
E[Q(B−1)] =
(B − 1)L
B + 1
. (4.13)
The average auction duration in this case is simply the sum of B average inter-
arrival times, or B/λ, which is identical to that of Algorithm V.
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Algorithm 10 Vickrey forward auction with bid enumeration termination.
Require: B > 0
Ensure: L2 + δ > 0 and accept id1 6= null
accept id1← null
accept id2← null
L1← 0
L2← 0
while B > 0 do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
B ← B − 1
if R > L1 then
L2← L1
L1← R
accept id2← accept id1
accept id1← bidder id
else if R > L2 then
L2← R
accept id2← bidder id
end if
end while
end while
return L2 + δ, accept id1
4.6 Auction Algorithm XI: Fixed-time Last-price
Reverse Auction
Some Internet auction processes follow the reverse auction mechanism. It is also fre-
quently used in e-procurement where governments and private sectors wish to obtain
goods or services (e.g. http://www.esourcingsolutions.co.uk). Typically, buyers
indicate what they require, with the sellers competing against each other to provide
the goods or services, and in doing so, the price is driven down. At the close of the
reverse auction, the lowest bid is selected (see Algorithm XI).
Note that this is different from a Dutch auction, which some also consider to be a
reverse auction. In a Dutch auction, the auction still seeks to obtain as high a price
as possible and involves an auctioneer starting at a very high asking price that is
continually lowered until some bidder is willing to accept the offer. The advantage
of this is that auctions can happen very fast as it only takes a single bid to end the
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auction; it plays off bidders’ fear of losing out and their drive towards a lower price.
Algorithm 11 Fixed-time last-price reverse auction.
Require: T > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
clock ← 0
L←∞
while clock < T do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
clock ← clock + t
if clock < T and R < L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
end if
end while
end while
return L, accept id
Here, we are interested in E[Q(1)], and the aim is to minimise expenditure rather
than maximising income. Again, from (Barry C. Arnold et al., 2008), it can be shown
that
E[Q(1)|Number of bids = N ] = L
N + 1
(4.14)
Unlike the forward auction situation, however, where for N = 0, the auction
income is zero, here, when N = 0, the maximum expenditure of L has to be paid,
so the term N = 0 cannot be ignored. Thus, following the techniques of previous
analysis, we have, for the unconditional average
E[Q(1)] =
∞∑
N=0
L
N + 1
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
Le−λT
λT
∞∑
N=0
(λT )N+1
(N + 1)!
=
L
λT
[
1− e−λT
]
, (4.15)
which is plotted in Figure 4-9, for T = 5, 10 and 15, with L = 100 and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-9: Average auction expenditure of fixed-time last-price reverse auction.
This gives an expenditure of
L
λT 2
[
1− e−λT
]
. (4.16)
4.7 Auction Algorithm XII: Variable-time Last-
price Reverse Auction with Fixed Inactivity
Window
Similar to Algorithm II, here the auction will terminate when there is no bid arrival
for a fixed window of length α. On termination, the smallest bid received will be
chosen (see Algorithm XII).
Here, the average auction duration is the same as that of Algorithm II, and is given
by Equation 3.7. Following similar arguments and using the same de-conditioning
probabilities as in Section 3.2, we have, from Equation 4.14.
E[Q(1)] =
∞∑
N=0
L
N + 1
×
(
1− e−λα
)N
e−λα =
Le−λα
1− e−λα
∞∑
N=0
(1− e−λα)N+1
N + 1
(4.17)
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Algorithm 12 Variable-time last-price reverse auction with fixed inactivity window.
Require: α > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
L←∞
loop
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
if t < α then
if R < L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
end if
else
return L, accept id
end if
end while
end loop
This gives, on making use of the logarithmic series in Equation 3.10,
E[Q(1)] =
Lλα
eλα − 1 , (4.18)
which is plotted in Figure 4-10, for α = 1, 2 and 3, with L = 100 and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-10: Average auction expenditure of variable-time last-price reverse auction
with fixed inactivity window.
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4.8 Auction Algorithm XIII: Fixed-time Last-price
Reverse Auction with Minimum Threshold Ter-
mination
This is similar to Algorithm III, except that the auction may terminate before the
expiry of T , if a sufficiently low bid is received. We let this minimum threshold be m,
so that whenever an arriving bid is below or equal to m, then the auction terminates
immediately and that bid is accepted. Thus, if a low enough bid is received, one
would not wish to waste any more time in waiting for another offer, which may or
may not result in an improvement (see Algorithm XIII)
Algorithm 13 Fixed-time last-price reverse auction with minimum threshold termi-
nation.
Require: M > 0 and T > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
clock ← 0
L←∞
while clock < T do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
clock ← clock + t
if clock < T and R < L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
if L ≤M then
return L, accept id
end if
end if
end while
end while
return L, accept id
Analogous to the Buy-It-Now (BIN) situation in forward auctions, in the Sell-It-
Now (SIN) situation, if a bid arrives with a value that is less than or equal to m, it is
immediately accepted. As in the forward auctions, the value m may be kept private
or made known to the public.
Here, we let p = Pr[Bid ≤ m] = m/L, p′ = Pr[Bid > m] = 1 − m/L. Thus,
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for each arrival, there is a probability p that it will meet the minimum threshold
requirement. There are two Poisson arrival streams with rates Λ = λp and Λ′ = λp′,
with λ = Λ+Λ′. The first sub-stream Λ meets the minimum threshold and its arrival
will terminate the auction immediately, while the second sub-stream Λ′ fails to meet
the minimum threshold and will allow the auction to continue. The first arrival of
the Λ sub-stream at time t before T would terminate the auction at t immediately,
which happens with probability Λe−Λtdt. Averaging over all such arrivals before T
gives
∫ T
0
Λte−Λtdt =
1− eΛt(ΛT + 1)
Λ
.
On the other hand, if the first arrival from this sub-stream Λ occurs after T , then
the auction duration would be T , which happens with probability e−ΛT . Therefore,
averaging over both possibilities, we have for the mean auction duration E[Tm] for
this case
E[Tm] =
1− eΛt(ΛT + 1)
Λ
+ Te−ΛT =
1− e−ΛT
Λ
=
1− e−λmT/L
λm/L
That is,
E[Tm] =
L− Le−λmT/L
λm
. (4.19)
We see that E[Tm] →
(
1− e−λT
)
/λ as m → L, which may be interpreted as:
if there is an arrival before T , which happens with probability
(
1− e−λT
)
, then the
auction lasts for a duration of 1/λ which is just the time of the first arrival, and this
arrival is immediately accepted because it must be less than m. On the other hand,
as m→ 0, E[Tm]→ T (which can be seen by application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule). Again,
as shown previously in Section 3.3,
(
1− e−ΛT
)
/Λ < T , which shows that E[Tm] < T .
Figure 4-11 plots the mean auction duration against the bid rate λ for values of
m = 25, 50, 75 for L = 100 and T = 4. We see that, as the bid rate increases, the
likelihood of receiving a bid less than m also increases, and so the average auction
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duration drops. This algorithm is able to reduce the auction duration from T = 4 for
moderate to large values of m quite substantially.
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Figure 4-11: Average auction duration of fixed-time last-price reverse auction with
minimum threshold termination.
In determining the average auction expenditure, the symmetry between the cur-
rent algorithm and Algorithm III is used. Considering the interval (0, L), and noting
that the distance or magnitude between the auction income and L in Algorithm III
is the same as that between the auction expenditure here and 0, which is precisely
the average auction expenditure in the present algorithm. Thus, the current average
auction expenditure is given by
L− E [QM ] ,
and on replacing M by L−m, the average auction expenditure can be obtained:
E [Qm] = L−
(2L−m)
(
1− e−ΛT
)
2
+
(L−m)e−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
) ,(4.20)
where Λ′ = λm/L and Λ = λ(1 −m/L) and which is plotted in Figure 4-12, for
m = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100, T = 10 and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-12: Average auction expenditure of fixed-time last-price reverse auction with
minimum threshold termination and Closed Sell-It-Now (CSIN).
For the Open Sell-It-Now (OSIN) case, the average auction expenditure is
E [Qm] = L−
[
(L−m)
(
1− e−ΛT
)
+
(L−m)e−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
)]
(4.21)
which is plotted in Figure 4-13, for m = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100, T = 10
and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-13: Average auction expenditure of fixed-time last-price reverse auction with
minimum threshold termination and Open Sell-It-Now (OSIN).
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4.9 Auction Algorithm XIV: Variable-time Last-
price Reverse Auction with Fixed Inactivity
Window and Minimum Threshold Termination
This is similar to Algorithm XII with an additional termination condition that the
auction mechanism will accept a bid if it is sufficiently low (see Algorithm XIV).
Here, the auction can be terminated either
1. by having none of the bid arrivals meeting the minimum threshold and the
auction finishes on the expiry of a no bid interval of length α, or
2. by having an arrival which meets the minimum threshold m before the auction
terminates through (1).
Algorithm 14 Variable-time last-price reverse auction with fixed inactivity window
and minimum threshold termination.
Require: α > 0 and M > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
L←∞
loop
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
if t < α then
if R < L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
if L ≤M then
return L, accept id
end if
end if
else
return L, accept id
end if
end while
end loop
As in the previous algorithm, the auction expenditure here is best determined
by observing the symmetry between the auction expenditure here and that in Algo-
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rithm IV. Thus, the average auction expenditure here is:
L− E [Q′M ] , (4.22)
which can be written as, on replacing M by (L−m),
L− (L−m)e
−λα
[
1− Λ′α
eΛ′α−1
]
+
(
1− e−Λα
) [
1− (L−m
L
+ L−m
L
e−λα
] (
2L−m
2
)
e−λα + (1− e−Λα)
(
1− L−m
L
+ L−m
L
e−λα
) , (4.23)
which is plotted in Figure 4-14, for m = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100, α = 3
and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-14: Average auction expenditure of variable-time last-price reverse auction
with fixed inactivity window and minimum threshold termination and Closed Sell-It-
Now (CSIN).
For the Open Sell-It-Now (OSIN) case, the average auction expenditure is
L− (L−m)e
−λα
[
1− Λ′α
eΛ′α−1
]
+ (L−m)
(
1− e−Λα
) [
1− (L−m
L
+ L−m
L
e−λα
]
e−λα + (1− e−Λα)
(
1− L−m
L
+ L−m
L
e−λα
) (4.24)
which is plotted in Figure 4-15, for M = 20, 40, 60 and 80, with L = 100, α = 3
and δ0 = δ = 0.
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Figure 4-15: Average auction expenditure of variable-time last-price reverse auction
with fixed inactivity window and minimum threshold termination and Open Sell-It-
Now (OSIN).
As for the auction duration, from Algorithm IV, the following equation can be
written for the average auction duration:
E [τm] =
(
1− e−λα
){1− e−λα(λα + 1)
λ (1− e−λα) +
(
1− m
L
)
E [τm]
}
+ αe−λα.
This gives,
E [τm] =
1− e−λα
λ
[
m
L
+
(
1− m
L
)
e−λα
] . (4.25)
4.10 Auction Algorithm XV: Last-price Reverse
Auction with Bid Enumeration Termination
This is similar to Algorithm X, except that the lowest bid is accepted (see Algo-
rithm XV).
Thus, the average magnitude of the accepted bid, from the results of order statis-
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Algorithm 15 last-price reverse auction with bid enumeration termination.
Require: B > 0
Ensure: L > 0 and accept id 6= null
accept id← null
L←∞
while B > 0 do
while newbid(t, R, bidder id) do
B ← B − 1
if R < L then
L← R
accept id← bidder id
end if
end while
end while
return L, accept id
tics is,
E
[
Q(B)
]
=
L
B + 1
(4.26)
4.11 Results Summary
Tables 4.1 and 4.2, summarise the main properties of the different algorithms.
For the Vickrey auction, as expected, the auction income is less than the income
obtained from a first-price auction for the same bid rate. Since the Vickrey auction
encourages bidder participation due to the winner only paying a single bid increment
over the second price, the bid rate may be significantly higher, counteracting any loss
in income. The reverse auction, on the other hand, is a good counterpoint to the
auction algorithms detailed in Chapter 3.
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Algorithm Average Auction Duration Average Offer Accepted Per Auction
VI T λTe−λT δo + LλT
(
λT + λTe−λT + 2e−λT − 2
)
+ δ
VII e
λα−1
λ
(
1− e−λα
)
× e−λαδo + 2Leλα−1 [sinhλα− λα] + δ
VIII
L−Le−λT(1−
M
L )
λ(L−M)
(M+L)(1−e−ΛT )
2
+ Me
−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + Λ′Te−Λ
′T + 2e−Λ
′T − 2
)
[CBIN]
L−Le−λT(1−
M
L )
λ(L−M) M
(
1− e−ΛT
)
+ Me
−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + Λ′Te−Λ
′T + 2e−Λ
′T − 2
)
[OBIN]
IX
e−Λα
[
1−e−Λ′α(Λ′α+1)
]
Λ′[1−e−Λα(1−e−Λ′α)] +
1−e−Λα
Λ
(1−e−Λα)(M+L)
2
+ 2Me
−Λα
eΛ′α−1 [sinh Λ
′α− Λ′α] [CBIN]
e−Λα
[
1−e−Λ′α(Λ′α+1)
]
Λ′[1−e−Λα(1−e−Λ′α)] +
1−e−Λα
Λ
M
(
1− e−Λα
)
+ 2Me
−Λα
eΛ′α−1 [sinh Λ
′α− Λ′α] [OBIN]
X B
λ
(B−1)L
B+1
Table 4.1: Vickrey auctions.
101
Algorithm Average Auction Duration Average Offer Accepted Per Auction
XI T L
λT
(
1− e−λT − λTe−λT
)
XII e
λα−1
λ
L
eλα−1
[
λα + e−λα − 1
]
XIII
L−Le−λmT/L
λm
L−
[
(2L−m)(1−e−ΛT )
2
+ (L−m)e
−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
)]
[CBIN]
L−Le−λmT/L
λm
L−
[
(L−m)
(
1− e−ΛT
)
+ (L−m)e
−ΛT
Λ′T
(
Λ′T + e−Λ
′T − 1
)]
[OBIN]
XIV
e−Λα
[
1−e−Λ′α(Λ′α+1)
]
Λ′[1−e−Λα(1−e−Λ′α)] +
1−e−Λα
Λ
L−
(L−m)e−λα
[
1− Λ′α
eΛ
′α−1
]
+(1−e−Λα)[1− (L−mL +L−mL e−λα]( 2L−m2 )
e−λα+(1−e−Λα)(1−L−mL +L−mL e−λα)
[CBIN]
e−Λα
[
1−e−Λ′α(Λ′α+1)
]
Λ′[1−e−Λα(1−e−Λ′α)] +
1−e−Λα
Λ
L−
(L−m)e−λα
[
1− Λ′α
eΛ
′α−1
]
+(L−m)(1−e−Λα)[1− (L−mL +L−mL e−λα]
e−λα+(1−e−Λα)(1−L−mL +L−mL e−λα)
[OBIN]
XV B
λ
L
B+1
Table 4.2: Reverse auctions.
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Chapter 5
Analysis of Surplus and Economic
Benefits
The concept of allocative efficiency (or sometimes called operational efficiency) is
often employed to evaluate how Internet auctions perform (Vragov, 2010) in terms of
economic benefits to the participants concerned. The seller surplus is the difference
between the transaction price and the seller’s costs, while the difference between
the buyer’s valuation and the transaction price gives the buyer surplus or consumer
surplus (see Figure 5-1). The seller’s costs is sometimes generically called production
cost, which apart from the actual cost of production would also include other such
costs as those associated with distribution, transportation, packaging, delivery, or
insurance. The total surplus is the seller surplus plus the buyer surplus, and the
allocative efficiency is given by the total actual realised surplus expressed as a fraction
of the total possible surplus (Vragov, 2010). For simplicity, these quantities are
represented in Figure 5.1 as linear functions, but the basic ideas remain the same if
one or more of these are non-linear. Since the total surplus (L− I)+(I−C) = L−C
is constant, an increase in seller surplus would mean a reduction in buyer surplus and
vice versa. In the next section, we shall first study the surplus analysis and design
options relating to hard close auctions.
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Figure 5-1: Measures of auction surpluses.
5.1 Surplus Analysis and Economic Benefits of Hard
Close Auctions
From the buyers’ point of view, their valuation of the auction item is indicated by the
maximum price L that they are willing to pay. As indicated earlier, the buyer surplus
is given by the difference in buyer valuation and the transaction price. Thus, for the
fixed time first-price forward auction the buyer surplus β is given by the difference in
buyer valuation and the transaction price, which from Chapter 3, is
β(z) = L− L
λT
(λT + e−λT − 1) = L
λT
(1− e−λT ) = L
z
(1− e−z) > 0 (5.1)
Here, we have used z = λT , which gives the average number of bids arriving in the
interval (0, T ). Thus, the above equation can be interpreted as follows: the consumer
surplus is the private value evenly divided by the number of bids times the probability
of having a non-empty auction (i.e. an auction where there is at least one arriving
bid). We see that the higher the value of L, the greater is the buyer surplus, and
also the greater the probability of having a non-empty auction (1− e−z), the higher
is the expected buyer surplus. Bidder collusion behaviour—where bidders collude in
order to lower the transaction price—may be incorporated by having a lower value
104
of L. On the other hand, shilling behaviour—where the seller artificially inflates the
transaction price through disguising as bidders—may be reflected by a higher value
for z = λT , Differentiating the consumer surplus with respect to z, we have
dβ(z)
dz
= − L
z2
(1− e−z − ze−z) = − L
z2
[1− 1 + z
ez
]. (5.2)
Since z > 0 for non-empty auctions, and from the series expansion of ez, we have
(1 + z) < ez, so that
1 + z
ez
< 1 (5.3)
and thus
dβ(z)
dz
= − L
z2
[1− 1 + z
ez
] < 0 (5.4)
Thus, we see that shilling will reduce the buyer surplus while raising the seller
surplus. From the seller’s point of view, another mechanism available for the seller
to increase the seller surplus is to adjust the auction duration. Since
dβ(z)
dT
= −λL
z2
[1− 1 + z
ez
] < 0 (5.5)
by extending the auction duration, the consumer surplus will be eroded and ac-
cordingly the seller surplus will increase.
From the seller’s perspective, it would be of interest to see how the auction income
is approached. For example, if it is approached much faster than the uniform rate
of increase, then there may be scope for adjusting the auction duration downwards.
Here, we may use an index to measure this similar to the computation of the Gini
coefficient in measuring the unevenness of income distribution (Firebaugh, 2003). In
Figure 5-2, we compare the auction income
Q(z) = L[1− 1− e
−z
z
] (5.6)
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against the uniform rate of increase as a function of z.
Auction duration (s)
Income
A
B
Figure 5-2: The Gini auction ratio.
We may regard the auction curve in Equation 5.6 as analogous to the Lorenz curve
in the Gini coefficient. The equation of the uniform straight line curve for auction
termination at z = k is given by
U(z) =
Lz
k
[1− 1− e
−k
k
] (5.7)
which starts from zero and ends at the same point at Q(k). The areas A and B
in Figure 5-2 is given respectively by
A =
∫ k
0
U(z)dz (5.8)
and
B =
∫ k
0
Q(z)dz −
∫ k
0
U(z)dz (5.9)
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Analogous to the Gini coefficient, we calculate
G =
A+B
A
=
∫ k
0 Q(z)dz∫ k
0 U(z)dz
(5.10)
which we may call the Gini auction ratio. Since
A =
∫ k
0
U(z)dz =
Lk
2
[1− 1− e
−k
k
] (5.11)
and
A+B =
∫ k
0
Q(z)dz = L[k − loge k − Γ(0, k)− γ] (5.12)
where Γ(a, x) is the incomplete gamma function, and γ is the Euler-Mascheroni
constant (from Wolfram Alpha), the Gini auction ratio is evaluated to be
G =
2[k − loge k − Γ(0, k)− γ]
k − 1 + e−k (5.13)
Having a Gini auction ratio significantly greater than one would indicate that a
relatively high auction income is fetched compared with the uniform rate of increase,
and therefore there is scope for reducing the auction duration without sacrificing the
auction income too much. For example, for L = 100, k = 10, we have
G =
712.02
450
= 1.58, (5.14)
which signifies that there is scope for reducing the auction duration. For λ = 0.5,
this corresponds to an auction duration of T = 2k = 20, and the size of the above
ratio suggests that the auction duration can possibly be adjusted to below 20 without
causing a large reduction in the auction income.
In many of the Internet auctions, Vickrey auctions are used, and sellers frequently
have to consider the choice between holding first-price auctions and Vickrey auctions.
Although Vickrey auctions clearly have the advantage in assuring the bidders that
they would not overpay and hence encourage wider bidder participation, doing so
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would seem to erode the seller surplus. The buyer surplus in the Vickrey auction is,
from Chapter 4,
βv(z) = L− L
z
(z + ze−z + 2e−z − 2) (5.15)
Upon simplification, this becomes
βv(z) =
2L
zez
[ez − (1 + z
2
)] (5.16)
Since, from Equation 3.5, for z > 0,
ez > 1 + z > (1 +
z
2
) (5.17)
we conclude from Equation 5.16 that βv(z) > 0.
Since the buyer pays a lower price in Vickrey auctions, it is useful to compare
the buyer surplus of a first-price auction with that of a Vickrey auction. From Equa-
tions 5.1 and 5.16 and simplifying, we have for the buyer surplus ratio
βv(z)
β(z)
= 2− z
ez − 1 (5.18)
which shall be referred to as the Vickrey surplus ratio. We see that, by application
of L’Hoˆpital’s rule,
z
ez − 1 → 1asz → 0 (5.19)
so that the Vickrey surplus ratio
βv(z)
β(z)
→ 1asz → 0 (5.20)
Also, since
z
ez − 1 → 0asz →∞ (5.21)
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which can be seen on expanding ez , we have
βv(z)
β(z)
→ 2asz →∞ (5.22)
which shows that the buyer surplus advantage for Vickrey auction is maintained
in such situation even when the number of bids is large.
On the other hand, the seller surplus for the first-price auction is
ζ(z) =
L
z
(z + e−z − 1)− C (5.23)
and the seller surplus for the Vickrey auction is
ζv(z) =
L
z
(z + ze−z + 2e−z − 2)− C (5.24)
By holding a Vickrey auction instead of a first-price auction, the seller surplus
will be reduced, and the drop in seller surplus is
ζ(z)− ζv(z) = L
z
(1− e−z − ze−z) = L
z
[1− (1 + z
ez
)] (5.25)
Since ez > (1 + z), we have therefore
ζ(z)− ζv(z) ≤ L
z
(5.26)
which → 0, as z → ∞. That is, when the expected number of bids is large,
the drop in seller surplus becomes insignificant. Consequently, for such a situation,
the seller may choose to hold a Vickrey auction instead of a first-price one since
the difference in seller surplus is small. Very often, buyers would prefer a Vickrey
auction over a first-price one because the former would give them the psychological
assurance that they are not overpaying in relation to other bidders. This would
motivate wider participation from the bidding community. For this reason, it may
be argued that Vickrey auctions should be held in any case in preference over first-
price auctions, since with first-price auctions, z may be moderate or small, while with
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Vickrey auctions, z may shoot up to much higher values so that there would be only
insignificant drop, if any, in seller surplus.
Taking this a step further, it is possible that the drop in surplus may become
negative due to the effect of Vickrey auctions on z. In fact, letting z1 be the expected
number of bids for a first-price auction, and z2 be the expected number of bids for
the corresponding Vickrey auction, the difference in seller surplus is
ζ(z1)− ζv(z2) = L
z1
(z1 + e
−z1 − 1)− L
z2
(z2 + z2e
−z2 + 2e−z2 − 2) (5.27)
This implies that the seller surplus would go negative if
1
z1
(e−z1 − 1) < e−z2 + 2
z2
(e−z2 − 1) (5.28)
Since the first term on the right hand side exp(−z2) is always positive, a sufficient
condition for the above inequality is
1
z1
(e−z1 − 1) < 2
z2
(e−z2 − 1) (5.29)
Multiplying both sides by -1 and reversing the direction of the inequality, we have
1
z1
(1− e−z1) > 2
z2
(1− e−z2) (5.30)
or
z2
z1
>
2(1− e−z2)
1− e−z1 (5.31)
Since [1 − exp(−z2)] is the probability of non-empty auction, it is less than one,
and so a sufficient condition of the above becomes
z2
z1
>
2
1− e−z1 (5.32)
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That is, we can conclude that if
z2 >
2z1
1− e−z1 (5.33)
the seller surplus of the Vickrey auction would be higher than the seller surplus of
the corresponding first-price auction. For example, if z1 = 1, this condition would be
met if z2 > 3.16; and if z1 = 5, this condition would be met if z2 > 10.07 ' 2z1. For
L = 100, C = 20, Table 5.1 compares the seller surpluses of the first-price auctions
with those of the Vickrey auctions for cases when the lower bound in Equation 5.33
is used, and when z2 = 2z1. We see that the seller surpluses of Vickrey auctions
can be noticeably higher than those of first-price auctions when the average number
of bids is suitably raised in the former. Eventually, however, this difference in seller
surpluses diminishes as the number of arriving bids grows. We also observe that using
the approximation z2 = 2z1 instead of the bound in Equation 5.33 although does not
work well when the average number of arriving bids is small, it is acceptable for higher
values.
Earlier, we have shown that the buyer surplus ratio between the Vickrey and the
first-price auctions is maintained at around two when the number of bids is large.
This is assuming we have the same value for z in both cases. As we have just seen,
the Vickrey auctions may stimulate greater bidder participation, so that it is useful
to compare the buyer surplus ratio when the z values are different for the two types
of auctions. Again, if z1 is the expected number of bids for a first-price auction, and
z2 is the expected number of bids for the corresponding Vickrey auction, the buyer
surplus ratio becomes, from equations (1) and (7) and simplifying
βv(z2)
β(z1)
= (
z1
z2
)[
2(1− e−z2)− z2e−z2
1− e−z1 ] (5.34)
We wish to determine the condition for which the Vickrey auction buyer surplus
falls below that of the first-price auction surplus, which is equivalent to
(
z1
z2
)[
2(1− e−z2)− z2e−z2
1− e−z1 ] < 1 (5.35)
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z1 z2 lower
bound
Average
first-price
seller sur-
plus
Average
Vickrey
seller sur-
plus (from
Equa-
tion 5.33
)
Average
Vickrey
seller
surplus
(z2 = 2z1)
1 3.16 16.79 23.69 7.07
1.5 3.86 28.21 31.40 21.63
2 4.63 36.77 38.17 32.75
2.5 5.45 43.28 43.87 40.94
3 6.31 48.33 48.56 47.00
3.5 7.22 52.29 52.39 51.55
4 8.15 55.46 55.49 55.04
4.5 9.10 58.02 58.04 57.79
5 10.07 60.13 60.14 60.01
5.5 11.05 61.89 61.89 61.82
6 12.03 63.37 63.38 63.33
6.5 13.02 64.64 64.64 64.62
7 14.01 65.73 65.73 65.71
7.5 15.01 66.67 66.67 66.67
8 16.01 67.50 67.50 67.50
Table 5.1: Comparison of seller surplus when the number of arriving bids is different.
or, upon simplification,
z2 > [
2z1(1− e−z2)− z1z2e−z2
1− e−z1 ] (5.36)
Since [1− exp(−z2)] is a probability and therefore lies between zero and one, and
the second term is positive, therefore a sufficient condition of the above becomes
z2 > [
2z1
1− e−z1 ] (5.37)
Thus, under this condition, the buyer surplus of a Vickrey auction with an average
number of bids z2 would be lower than the buyer surplus of a first-price auction with
an average number of bids z1. Apart from surplus considerations, the seller is often
interested in the rate at which the average auction income is earned. Since z = λT ,
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the income rate for first-price auction is given by
λE[Q(N)]
z
=
λL
z
[1− 1− e
−z
z
] (5.38)
From the seller’s point of view, sometimes his/her auctions cannot be run contin-
uously, i.e. it may not be possible to arrange things so that, as soon as one auction
finishes, another one of the same seller’s auction will start immediately, and there is
a time delay between the auctions from the same seller. For example, in the model of
(Gelenbe, 2009), there is a random rest time before the next auction from the seller is
initiated. Such additional time delay between auctions will result in a lower auction
income rate for the seller. Such a delay may be due to queueing, since there may be
a time elapsed between the request for an auction and the time when the auction is
actually run. If requests for auctions arrive as a Poisson stream with rate λ′, and all
auctions take a fixed amount of time T to run, then this situation may be modelled as
an M/D/1 queue, and the average waiting time for an auction to commence is given
by the Pollaczek-Khintchine formula (Gross et al., 2008)
E(W ′) =
ρT
2(1− ρ) (5.39)
where ρ = λ′T is the traffic intensity. This gives an overall average total time for
completing an auction, as measured from the time of making a request to run the
auction
E(W ) = E(W ′) + T =
T (2− ρ)
2(1− ρ) (5.40)
The income rate for the first-price auction therefore becomes
E[Q(N)]
E(W )
=
λL
z
[1− 1− e
−z
z
][
2(1− ρ)
2− ρ ] (5.41)
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Compared with Equation 5.38, the income rate is reduced by a factor of
f = [
2(1− ρ)
2− ρ ] = 1−
ρ
2− ρ (5.42)
Since for a stable queueing system, ρ < 1, so that the above factor is less than
one. This reduction is less rapid than a linear decline if
f > 1− ρ (5.43)
or
2(1− ρ)
2− ρ > 1− ρ. (5.44)
This gives
2
2− ρ > 1, (5.45)
which is true for 0 < ρ < 1. Thus the average income reduction is slower than the
linear income reduction rate. Figure 5-3 plots the income rate reduction factor f as a
function of ρ, which also shows a comparison with the linear income reduction rate.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
2(x−1)
x−2
1− x
Figure 5-3: Income reduction factor for different traffic intensity values
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We see that the income rate reduction is slight under relatively light traffic con-
ditions, (e.g. when the traffic intensity is below 0.2), but can drop to below 10% of
the original value under heavy traffic conditions (e.g. when the traffic intensity is over
0.9). We also see that the income rate decline is significantly slower than the linear
rate which indicates a relatively subdued reduction behaviour. When the traffic in-
tensity is 2/3, the reduction in auction income rate is approximately 50%, compared
with the no queueing situation.
For Vickrey auctions, the income rate is
λE[Q(N−1)]
z
=
λL
z2
(z + ze−z + 2e−z − 2). (5.46)
Following similar arguments, the reduced auction income rate is
E[Q(N−1)]
E(W )
=
λfL
z2
(z + ze−z + 2e−z − 2) (5.47)
which will decline in the same pattern as depicted in Figure 5-3.
In situations where different auction requests take different amounts of (fixed)
time to run, then this will be an M/G/1 queue instead of an M/D/1 queue. If the
distribution of the fixed auction durations is uniform over the integers {1, 2, . . . , D},
then the mean service time is
1
D
D∑
k=1
k =
D + 1
2
(5.48)
and the second moment of the service time is
1
D
D∑
k=1
k2 =
(D + 1)(2D + 1)
6
(5.49)
Thus, from the Pollaczek-Khintchine formula, the average waiting time for an
auction to commence is
E(V ′) =
ρ′(2D + 1)
6 (1− ρ′) , (5.50)
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where the traffic intensity here is ρ′ = λ′(D + 1)/2.
For a particular known fixed auction duration T ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}, the average total
time for completing an auction measured from the time of making a request to run
the auction
E(V ) = E(V ′) + T =
ρ′(2D + 1)
6 (1− ρ′) + T. (5.51)
resulting in an average first-price auction income rate of
E
[
Q(N)
]
E(V )
= L
[
1− 1− e
−z
z
]
/
[
ρ′(2D + 1)
6 (1− ρ′) + T
]
. (5.52)
Compared with the income rate when there is no queueing delay in auction com-
mencement, the average auction income rate reduction factor is
f ′ = T/
[
ρ′(2D + 1)
6 (1− ρ′) + T
]
(5.53)
A stable system requires ρ′ < 1 or λ′ < 2/(D+ 1). For D = 5, the allowable range
of values for λ′ to ensure system stability is (0, 0.33), and for T = 1, this results in
the following rate reduction factor
f ′ =
2− 6λ′
2 + 5λ′
. (5.54)
The above analysis is exact for situations where a website offers a single auction
channel, or when certain categories of auctions (e.g. consumer auctions vs business
auctions) are directed to one particular auction channel. In situations where a website
supports multiple simultaneous auctions irrespective of auction categories, then the
underlying queue may be regarded as a multi-channel queue and should be modelled
by an M/G/m queue. However, for this queue, there is in general no closed-form
solution available. Even for the M/D/m queue, there is no neat solution for the
mean waiting time (Gross et al., 2008). However, the above may be regarded as a
type of approximation—here we split a single M/G/m queue into several M/G/1
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queues, by evenly dividing the traffic to each queue. That is, if there are m servers,
and if the overall auction traffic arrival rate is λ∗, then the auction arrival rate for
each queue is λ′ = λ∗/m. In this approximation, there is a slight over-estimation
of the waiting time compared with the single M/G/m case, since the allocation of
servers to customers may be less efficient in the multiple single server queues. In
particular, some single server queues may be idle even though others may have long
queues of waiting customers—this situation would not arise in the M/G/m case where
all servers would be busy whenever there are waiting customers.
5.2 Accepting Multiple Bids and Auction Fees
From the seller’s point of view, the aim of auction is to attain improvements in
seller surplus through expending more time to achieve a higher price or income. If
one simply accepts the first bid that comes along, then its average magnitude is
E [Qi] = L/2. By holding an auction, the average gain in surplus per bid acceptance
due to one auction, assuming there are N bids, is
E
[
Q(N)|N
]
− E [Qi|N ] = LN
N + 1
− L
2
(5.55)
=
(N − 1)L
2(N + 1)
. (5.56)
If there are two or more identical items for sale, to speed things up one might
accept the two highest bids, instead of the just the highest one. Accepting more than
one bid per auction is quite common in Internet auctions; e.g. Google’s ad auctions
often accept several bids. From (Barry C. Arnold et. al. 2008), it is shown that the
k-th order statistic of N samples from a uniform distribution distributed over a given
interval is k/(N + 1) of the length of the interval. Thus, in accepting the two highest
bids in one auction, the average gain in seller surplus per bid acceptance is:
1
2
{(
E
[
Q(N)|N
]
− E [Qi|N ]
)
+ (5.57)(
E
[
Q(N−1)|N
]
− E [Qi|N ]
)}
(5.58)
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=
1
2
(
E
[
Q(N)|N
]
− E
[
Q(N−1)|N
])
− E [Qi|N ] (5.59)
=
L
2
[
N
N + 1
+
N − 1
N + 1
]
− L
2
(5.60)
=
(N − 2)L
2(N + 1)
, (5.61)
which is less than the gain in seller surplus in the case where only one bid is accepted,
but it takes only one instead of two auction times and associated costs to achieve
two acceptances. Correspondingly, the average buyer surplus will increase, since the
transaction price of the second item is lower.
In general, the average of the highest K bids, given there are N bids, is
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]
=
L
K
K−1∑
j=0
N − j
N + 1
(5.62)
=
(2N −K + 1)L
2(N + 1)
. (5.63)
Thus, the conditional average gain in surplus per acceptance is
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
{
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]
− E [Qi|N ]
}
(5.64)
=
1
K

K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]− E [Qi|N ] (5.65)
=
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(j)|N
]
− L
2
(5.66)
=
(2N −K + 1)L
2(N + 1)
− L
2
(5.67)
=
(N −K)L
2(N + 1)
, (5.68)
which from Equation 5.56 is always below the gain in surplus resulting from accepting
a single bid per auction. The average total income in accepting the top K bids, from
Equation 5.63, is
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]
=
(2N −K + 1)LK
2(N + 1)
. (5.69)
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Consider a variation of the basic model, in which the K highest bids are accepted
in one auction. Note that accepting K highest bids requires that there are at least K
arrivals (and of course at least K items for sale), and for meaningful operation, this
requires that T  K×Mean Inter-arrival Time or λT  K. Removing the condition
on N , and noting that N ≥ K, we have, for the average total income in accepting
the top K bids,
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)
]
(5.70)
=
∞∑
N=K
LK(2N −K + 1)
2(N + 1)
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
(5.71)
=
LK
2
∞∑
N=K
[
2− K + 1
N + 1
]
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
(5.72)
= LK
∞∑
N=K
e−λT (λT )N
N !
− LK
2λT
∞∑
N=K
[
K + 1
N + 1
]
×e
−λT (λT )N+1
N !
(5.73)
= LK
∞∑
N=K
e−λT (λT )N
N !
−
LK(K + 1)
2λT
∞∑
N=K
e−λT (λT )N+1
(N + 1)!
(5.74)
= LK
1−
K−1∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
−
LK(K + 1)
2λT
1−
K∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
 . (5.75)
That is, we have for the expected income IK when we choose to accept K top bids
in a single auction
IK = LK
1−
K−1∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
−
LK(K + 1)
2λT
1−
K∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
 . (5.76)
We see that for K = 1, the above reduces to Equation 3.4, and for the important
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special case K = 2, we have
I2 =
L
λT
(
2λT + λTe−λT − (λT )
2e−λT
2
+ 3e−λT − 3
)
. (5.77)
Consider the cost Ω of holding an auction, which may be related to the auction
time and associated costs such as fees paid to the auction site, and payments to
financial intermediaries. We assume that these costs are otherwise not incurred if
the item is sold through other channels. Let the price of a unit of the good be C.
If no auctions are held, then the expected seller surplus would simply be (L/2− C),
where, as indicated from the arguments above, L/2 represents the average value of
the first offer, and we assume that it will be accepted. By holding an auction, the
seller surplus S becomes:
S =
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− (C + Ω). (5.78)
Thus, the break-even point of holding an auction is given by the improvement in
surplus offset by the auction cost
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− L
2
= Ω. (5.79)
As the auction extends in time, the expected income rises. Supposing one wishes
to attain a certain level of seller surplus So, then the minimal auction duration T
∗ is
given by the solution to the following equation
S0 =
L
λT ∗
(
λT ∗ + e−λT
∗ − 1
)
− (C + Ω). (5.80)
While we may solve for the above using numerical methods, we may obtain closed-
form solutions by using an approximation. An approximation will enable the quick
estimation of auction parameters and economic benefits without going through the
laborious process of numerical solution. We shall use an approximation based on
Equation 3.1. If we remove the condition on N there by replacing N by its average
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(from the Poisson distribution) of z = λT , we have approximately
E
[
Q(N)
] ∼= Lz
z + 1
. (5.81)
Figure 5-4 compares the average auction income from Equations 3.1 and the above
for L = 100 for different values of z = λT . We see that the approximation is quite
good for moderate to large values of z. For very large values of z, the exact formula
and the approximation are virtually indistinguishable. Using this approximation, the
above becomes
S0 =
Lz′
z′ + 1
− (C + Ω), (5.82)
giving
z′ =
S0 + C + Ω
L− (S0 + C + Ω) , (5.83)
and this will provide a reasonable approximation for z′  1. Thus, the approximate
optimal auction duration T ′ is
T ′ =
S0 + C + Ω
λ [L− (S0 + C + Ω)] , (5.84)
Letting S0 + C + Ω = 90, L = 100, and λ = 1, and numerically solving Equa-
tion 5.80 provides the exact minimum T ∗ in order to achieve a minimum surplus of
S0 which in this case is found to be T
∗ = 10 (see Figure 5-5). As can be seen from
Figure 5-5, any value of T > 10 will yield at least a surplus of S0. The corresponding
approximate solution gives T ′ = 90/(100 − 90) = 9, which yields an error of just
under 10%. From the seller’s point of view, in order to quickly determine the optimal
T ∗, while avoiding the elaborate procedure of finding a numerical solution to Equa-
tion 5.80, one can simply first solve for T ′, and then add a safety factor to ensure
that the resultant surplus ≥ S0 , which in the present case may be 10%. A higher
safety factor may be used to ensure greater certainty of achieving the required level
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of minimum surplus.
Next, the overall surplus in accepting K bids per auction is
IK −KC − Ω (5.85)
While the overall surplus in selling K items through K separate auctions would
be
LK
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
−K(C + Ω). (5.86)
Thus, it would be more profitable to sell K items in K separate auctions instead
of selling them in a single auction if the expected surplus of the latter is higher, i.e.
LK
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
−K(C + Ω) > IK −KC − Ω (5.87)
or
LK
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− (K − 1)Ω > IK (5.88)
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Figure 5-4: Comparison of exact analysis and approximation.
122
For the important special case K = 2, the above becomes
2L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− Ω > I2 (5.89)
and making use of Equation 5.77, this condition simplifies to
ez
(
1− zΩ
L
)
> 1 + z − z
2
2
. (5.90)
We see that in terms of magnitude, the left hand side increases exponentially in
z, while the right hand side increases quadratically. Thus, for sufficiently large z, the
left hand side will go negative with a large magnitude, while the right hand side will
also go negative with a comparatively smaller magnitude; consequently the above
inequality will not hold for large z. Thus, when the number of bids is large, it is
always preferable to sell the items in single auctions.
Sometimes, the auction fee structure is such that the auction website would charge
for a certain percentage of the income payment, which for instance is the common
practice of eBay. Denoting by ξ such a percentage, then the overall surplus in accept-
ing K bids per auction is
(1− ξ)IK −KC. (5.91)
In adopting the same approximation as before by suitably replacing N by λT ,
then from Equation 5.69, we have
IK ' (2λT −K + 1)LK
2(λT + 1)
. (5.92)
Using this approximation for the special case K = 2, we have
I2 ' (2λT − 1)L
λT + 1
, (5.93)
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so that the overall surplus is approximately
L(1− ξ)(2λT − 1)
λT + 1
− 2C. (5.94)
Thus it would be preferable to accept two bids per auction rather than to accept
a single bid in two separate auctions if
2(1− ξ)I1 − 2C < (1− ξ)I2 − 2C, (5.95)
or
2λTL
λT + 1
<
2λTL− L
λT + 1
, (5.96)
which is never the case for L > 0. Thus, for this particular auction fee structure,
unlike the previous case, it would always be preferable to run two separate auctions
rather than a single auction given that the number of bids is large. In fact, even when
the number of bids is not large, the general validity of this choice can be seen from
Equation 5.69, where the total income from running a single auction is
(1− ξ)IK|N = LK(1− ξ)(2N −K + 1)
2(N + 1)
, (5.97)
where IK|N signifies the total income conditioning on N . The corresponding quantity
in running K separate auctions is
KI1|N =
(1− ξ)NLK
N + 1
(5.98)
Thus, it is preferable to run separate auctions if
N
N + 1
>
2N −K + 1
2(N + 1)
(5.99)
which will be valid whenever K > 1. Thus, for this particular auction fee structure,
unlike the previous one, it is always more advantageous for the seller to sell the items
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in separate auctions.
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Figure 5-5: Numerical determination of optimal auction duration.
5.3 Surplus Analysis of Soft Close Auctions
For these auctions, a key parameter is s = λα, which is the expected number of bid
arrivals in a window of length α. For the soft close auctions of Algorithm II, the
buyer surplus, from equation (3.16), would be
β(s) = L− L
eλα − 1[e
λα − λα− 1] = sL
es − 1 (5.100)
Since
dβ(s)
ds
= −L[e
s(s− 1) + 1]
(es − 1)2 < 0 (5.101)
for s ≥ 1, which signifies that there is an average of at least one arrival in the
window of length α, we see that as s increases, the buyer surplus tends to diminish.
Similarly, for the soft close auctions of Algorithm VII, the buyer surplus, from
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Chapter 4, is
βv(s) = L− 2L
es − 1[sinh(s)− s] =
L(e−s + 2s− 1)
es − 1 (5.102)
Now
dβv(s)
ds
=
L[e−s − 4− es(2s− 3)]
(es − 1)2 (5.103)
Since exp(−s) < 1, for s > 0, and the last term is negative if s ≥ 2, combining
these, we conclude that
dβv(s)
ds
< 0 for s ≥ 2 (5.104)
The condition s ≥ 2 is a reasonable one, since s represents the average number
of bid arrivals in a window of length α, and for a Vickrey auction, it takes at least
two bids to make it meaningful. This condition implies that as s increases, the buyer
surplus tends to decline.
Since the buyer pays a lower price in Vickrey auctions, it is useful to compare
the buyer surplus of a first-price auction with that of a Vickrey auction. From equa-
tions 5.100 and 5.102 and simplifying, we have for the Vickrey surplus ratio for this
case
βv(s)
β(s)
=
e−s + 2s− 1
s
(5.105)
We see that, by application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule,
βv(s)
β(s)
→ 1 as s→ 0 (5.106)
Also, since the Vickrey surplus ratio can be written as
1
ses
+ 2− 1
s
(5.107)
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Thus, we see that
βv(s)
β(s)
→ 2 as s→∞ (5.108)
The case s→∞ corresponds to a situation where there are a very large number of
bid arrivals in the window of length α, which suggests that the probability of having
no arrivals in that window is very small. Consequently, this means that the auction
will be kept going indefinitely, and thus will last for an effectively infinite amount of
time. This is unlike the fixed auction time situations, where the auction will definitely
finish in a pre-determined amount of finite time.
On the other hand, the seller surplus for the first-price auction is
ξ(s) =
L[es − s− 1]
es − 1 − C (5.109)
and the seller surplus for the Vickrey auction is
ξv(s) =
2L
(es − 1)[sinh(s)− s]− C (5.110)
Thus, the seller surplus reduction by holding a Vickrey auction instead of first-
price auction is
ξ(s)− ξv(s) = L
(es − 1)[e
−s + s− 1] (5.111)
For s → 0, we see that, by application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule, that the reduction in
seller surplus → 0. Also, for as s → ∞, we see that each term of Equation 5.111 on
dividing by (es − 1) tends to 0, and so the reduction in seller surplus also → 0.
In Equation 5.108, we see the buyer surplus ratio between the Vickrey and the
first-price auctions is maintained at around two when the number of bids is large, when
there is the same average number of bids s in both cases. However, since Vickrey
auctions tend to encourage greater bidder participation, so that it is useful to compare
the buyer surplus ratio when the average number of bids in the Vickrey auctions is
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greater than the average number of bids in the first-price auction. We denote by s1
the expected number of bids for a first-price auction, and s2 the expected number of
bids for the corresponding Vickrey auction. Figure 5-6 plots the buyer surplus for
different average number of bids for the first-price auction and Vickrey auction with
L = 100. For ease of reference, the s value for the first-price auction shall be denoted
by s1, and the s value of the Vickrey auction shall be denoted by s2.
0 2 4 6 8 10
Average Bids
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Income
First-price Surplus
Vickrey Surplus
Figure 5-6: Comparison of buyer auction surpluses.
We see that when s1 = 2, the first-price auction buyer surplus is around 30,
which is greater than the Vickrey auction buyer surplus when s2 = 4 of around 13.
Table II shows the difference between the average number of bids for the same buyer
surpluses for the first-price and Vickrey auctions. We see that for the same amount
of surplus, the average number of bids for these two types of auctions tend to differ
by around 0.7 to 0.75 for this situation. Consequently, we see that here the buyer
surplus will be lower in Vickrey auctions if these are able to attract an additional
one bid in the window of (0, α). Thus, from the buyers’ point of view, it is preferable
to go for first-price auctions with fewer bidders than Vickrey auctions with many
bidders. This suggests that sometimes, if applicable, it may even be worthwhile to
pay a surcharge (which may take on a variety of forms such as tax, membership fee,
or additional delivery charge) to enter an auction in the hope that it would serve as
an inhibiting factor for other bidders so that the surplus gained would more than
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cover the surcharge. In addition, individually, it is worth noting that with either of
these two auction types, the buyer surplus drops steeply at first, and the drop slows
down when the average number of bids becomes large.
Buyer Surplus Average Number
of bids (Vickrey)
Average Number
of bids (First-
Price)
Difference in the
Average Number
of Bids
50 1.97 1.26 0.71
45 2.15 1.43 0.72
40 2.35 1.62 0.73
35 2.57 1.83 0.74
30 2.81 2.06 0.75
25 3.09 2.34 0.75
20 3.41 2.66 0.75
15 3.81 3.06 0.75
10 4.36 3.61 0.75
5 5.25 4.51 0.74
Table 5.2: Comparison of the average number of bids for equal surplus.
From the seller’s point of view, the seller surplus between the first-price auction
and the corresponding Vickrey auction would be
ξ(s1)− ξv(s2) < 0 (5.112)
if
es1 − s1 − 1
es1 − 1 <
2[sinh(s2)− s2]
(es2 − 1) (5.113)
Figure 5-7 plots the seller surplus for both types of auctions for C = 20. We see
that the two surplus curves tend to be parallel, separating by below one bid, initially.
For example, to attain a surplus of 50, we see that s1 = 2.06 and s2 = 2.81 with
s2− s1 = 0.75. Hence, if the seller is confident that by running a Vickrey auction, an
average of one additional bid is attracted to the auction, then the expected surplus of
the a Vickrey auction would be higher, and thus it would be better to run a Vickrey
auction instead of a first-price auction.
As for Algorithm V, if the buyer is aiming for a surplus of ξ, then B should be
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Figure 5-7: Comparison of seller auction surpluses.
chosen such that
C + ξ =
BL
B + 1
(5.114)
Solving for B gives
B = [
C + ξ
L− (c+ ξ) ] (5.115)
Since the above is generally not an integer, the ceiling function
[
C + ξ
L− (c+ ξ) ] (5.116)
should yield a surplus not less than ξ, since we have shown earlier that the auction
income is an increasing function of B.
Similarly, for Algorithm X, the parameter B should satisfy
C + ξ =
(B − 1)L
B + 1
(5.117)
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giving
B = [
L+ C + ξ
L− (C + ξ) ] (5.118)
which would yield a surplus not less than ξ. For example, if C + ξ = 80, L = 100,
then B in Algorithm V should be set to 4, while it should be set to 9 in Algorithm X.
From the buyers’ perspective, the buyer surplus for the first-price auction is
β = L− BL
B + 1
=
L
B + 1
(5.119)
while that for the Vickrey auction is
βv = L− (B − 1)L
B + 1
=
2L
B + 1
(5.120)
showing again that the buyer surplus for the Vickrey auction is twice that for the
first-price auction.
5.4 Surplus Analysis of Auctions with Threshold
Termination
For auctions with threshold termination, we have shown earlier that their average
duration is generally shorter than the corresponding auctions without the threshold
termination. For these auction algorithms, the arriving bids are probabilistically the
same as for the corresponding auctions without threshold termination. The only
difference between the two is that it would terminate prematurely upon receiving a
certain bid, otherwise the auction would continue through to usual completion. As we
have shown earlier, longer auctions tend to yield higher incomes, and since auctions
without threshold termination tend to run longer, their auction income is also higher
(of course, in the event that there is no arrival from the Λ-stream, the two auctions
would be identical in both duration and income), a property also evident from the
income graphs of earlier chapters.
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The setting of the threshold M by the sellers is related to the sellers’ view on
the magnitude of an acceptable surplus. If a seller regards ξ is an acceptable level
of minimum surplus, then the seller may set M = C + ξ. If the auction is finished
through threshold termination, then since the conditional income for this situation is
(M + L)/2, which is higher than M , then the seller would expect to fetch a surplus
exceeding ξ. However, as we have just indicated, such a surplus will still on average
be lower than the expected surplus were the auction be allowed to run its full course,
since the latter possibility will result in a longer auction and hence attaining higher
average income. For example, if the acceptable level of minimum surplus ξ is 30, then
for C = 20, we have M = 50 , and the expected auction income for L = 100, α = 3, is
plotted in Figure 5-9. We see that the minimum acceptable surplus is attained when
the arrival rate is 0.5, and when the arrival rate is 1, the surplus reaches 50. From
Chapter 3, the average auction income of Algorithm IV,
E[Q′M ] =
p1M [1− Λ′α(eΛ′α−1) ] + p2[M+L2 ]
P1 + P2
(5.121)
is a convex combination of two component incomes. The first one
M [1− Λ
′α
(eΛ′α − 1)] (5.122)
is bounded above by M , since
Λ′α
(eΛ′α − 1) < 1 (5.123)
which can be seen on expanding exp(Λ′α). On the other hand, the second one
[
M + L
2
] (5.124)
is bounded below by M , so that the second income is always greater than the first
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income. Therefore the average auction income is
E[Q′M ] ≤
p1[
M+L
2
] + p2[
M+L
2
]
p1 + p2
= [
M + L
2
] (5.125)
which in this case is (50+100)/2=75. We see from Figure 5-9 that the auction
income is always below 75. Indeed, as the bid rate increases, s→∞ and so p1 = es →
0, the average auction income gradually approaches this bound. This is intuitively
reasonable and is to be expected since when there is a large number of bids arriving,
the chance of one of them meeting the threshold requirement would accordingly be
high, and so the auction terminates at (M + L)/2.
As for Algorithm III, the average auction income, from Chapter 3, may be written
as
E[QM ] = e
−ΛTM [1− 1− e
−Λ′T
Λ′T
] + (1− e−ΛT )[M + L
2
] (5.126)
In order for the first component income to be less than M , the condition
(1− e−Λ′T )
Λ′T
< 1 (5.127)
has to be satisfied, which is equivalent to
(eΛ
′T − 1) < Λ′TeΛ′T (5.128)
Expanding both sides, we have
Λ′T +
(Λ′T )2
2!
+
(Λ′T )3
3!
+ ... < Λ′T + (Λ′T )2 +
Λ′T 3
2!
+
Λ′T 4
3!
+ . . . (5.129)
which is seen to be true on term by term comparison and noting that Λ′T > 0.
Thus the first component income in E
[
Q(M)
]
is less than M ; obviously, the second
income component is greater than M , and so
E[QM ] ≤ e−ΛT [M + L
2
] + (1− e−ΛT )[M + L
2
] = [
M + L
2
] (5.130)
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A plot of the average auction income for C = 30, ξ = 40, L = 100, T = 10, is shown
in Figure 5-8. We see that the acceptable surplus is reached when the bid rate is
around 0.34, and it converges to, but bounded by, 85 as the bid rate increases.
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Figure 5-8: Seller Surplus for Algorithm III.
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Figure 5-9: Seller Surplus for Algorithm IV.
As for Vickrey auctions with threshold termination, the same auction income
bound of (M + L)/2 also applies since the income component from non-threshold
termination here is even lower than that of the first-price auction. By the same
argument, when the bid rate is large, the chance of termination by reaching M would
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be high, and so the income upper bound of (M +L)/2 is likely to be attained. Thus,
for auctions with reasonably strong participation, there is little difference between
the first-price auctions and Vickrey auctions in terms of surplus.
5.5 Summary
From both the buyers and sellers points of view, apart from successfully buying
or selling the goods or services, a key objective is to reap maximum benefits from
auctions in the form of economic surpluses. Compared with buyers, sellers tend to
have greater flexibility and control over how an auction is being conducted. They
can choose the duration parameters of the auctions, as well as whether to run them
as first-price or Vickrey auctions. In addition, they can choose to incorporate the
buy-it-now option to possibly shorten the auction duration once a required level
of surplus is reached. We have analysed and compared the surpluses from both the
buyers and sellers perspectives for the different auction algorithms. From the analysis
performed, it is found that it would often be advantageous for sellers to run Vickrey
auctions rather than first-price auctions. Another auction design option available to
sellers when multiple items are for sale is whether or not to accept more than one
bid per auction. Doing so will obviously save time and effort, but will also lower the
average seller surplus. However, depending on the auction fee structure, accepting
more than one bid in an auction can sometimes yield greater economic benefits than
holding separate auctions. A factor which neither the sellers nor buyers have any
real control is the bid rate. From the buyers’ point of view, having a high bidder
participation rate is always disadvantageous for buyer surplus. Thus, it is sometimes
preferable for buyers to participate in less crowded first-price auctions than crowded
Vickrey auctions. Indeed, inhibiting participation from other bidders is so important
that it may sometimes pay to opt for those auctions with surcharge (if such choice
is applicable), in the expectation that the gain in surplus will more than cover the
surcharge. Of course, if such information is unavailable, then the buyers should always
opt for the Vickrey auction which generally yields twice the surplus compared with
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first-price auctions.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Validation & Design
6.1 Simulation Experimemts
To enable the comparison between observed and theoretical values and to validate the
mathematical models, an auction process simulator that implements the pseudo-code
listed in Algorithms I–XV, has been constructed in C++. In order to sample values
from the uniform and exponential distributions for the private value of bidders and
the rate of bids respectively, the Boost C++ Library is used. In particular, we use the
variate_generator with the uniform_01 and exponential_distribution headers,
which is implemented on top of the mersenne_twister psuedo-random number gen-
erator. The result is outputted as a space-delimited text string that states lambda,
which is the incoming rate of bids and usually the variable we change, the duration of
that auction, and the revenue generated from that auction. Ten-thousand trials are
run for each lambda which is sampled in 0.01 intervals in the units concerned over the
desired interval. The precision of results is set to ten digits. Usage of the simulator
is given in Figure 6-1.
A class diagram of the auction process simulator is presented in Figure 6-2. An
auction [-A algorithm] [-L L] [-l lambda] [-T T] [-a alpha]
[-M M] [-B B] [-d delta] [-t trials]
Figure 6-1: Auction process simulator usage.
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Internet auction website contains a number of buyers and sellers and runs multiple
auctions, each of which contains a subset of the auction website’s buyers and sellers
exchanging money for lots of goods and services. Each auction has a set of parameters
which equate to the parameters of the various algorithms.
Buyers have a utility function for each lot that is present at the auction website,
and if the utility gained from buying a lot at a specific price is greater than that
derived from holding the money, or using that lot to buy another lot, then the buyer
will offer to bid for that lot in an auction. Both the utility of a win and a loss is
required in determining how close a buyer should bid to his true valuation. If the loss
of an auction is very costly, the buyer should bid the true valuation of the lot straight
away, instead of trying to augment his utility by obtaining the lot at a lower price
that he was willing to pay for it. The confidence that a buyer has in his valuation
determines whether the valuation will be adjusted in the face of significantly higher or
lower bids from other bidders present in the auction. A high confidence in the values
means that the list of utility for each lot remains the same throughout an auction,
while a lower confidence may mean that the auction itself is, to a certain extent, a
price discovery mechanism for the bidder and his utility of obtaining the lot may vary
in accordance with the current bid levels. In the same way, the seller also has lists of
utilities and confidences, as well as a value for reputation which may result in a price
discount or premium in an auction depending on factors that may be external to the
lot, e.g. timeliness of delivery. Currently there are a few features listed in the class
diagram that have not been fully implemented such as the buyer and seller utilities,
confidence in their utility and their ratings at the auction website.
The class diagram uses standard Unified Modelling Language (UML) notation
and shows different classes, their attributes and methods, and how they inter-relate.
Private attributes and methods, which are known only to the class itself and to
no other classes, are preceded with a (-) symbol, while, if public, preceded by a
(+) symbol. There exists four main classes: the Auction Website, the Auction, the
Buyer and the Seller. Classes connected by just a line indicate association, while a
hollow diamond, aggregation, i.e. “Class A has Class B”, with the hollow diamond-
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end connecting to the container class (A). A solid diamond, on the other hand, means
composition, which is a stronger version of association, with the associated class often
unable to exist if the class to which it is associated is destroyed. Numbers at two ends
of the lines, indicate multiplicity, or the number of classes that participate in that
association, e.g. “1..*” indicates an association that relates to “1 or more” classes.
Thus, in Figure 6-2, an auction house/website runs one or more auctions which have
parameters determining whether it is first-price or k-price, whether it has a minimum
or maximum limit on the number of bids, and can either be a fixed time or variable
time auction. Furthermore, each auction takes place by auctioning off a lot which is
transferred from one owner (the seller) to another owner (the buyer), each of which
has an associated reputation and wealth. Sellers can also set a reserve price on a lot,
while each buyer has a valuation of each lot (consisting of an associated utility and
confidence in that utility), which determines the amounts that the buyer should bid
for those lots.
Auction
House / Website
  admit (entity)
  depart (entity)
Entity
  entity_id: int
  name: string
  money: int
  rating: int
Seller
  offer (lot)
Auction
  auction_id: int
  first_price: bool
  min_bids: int
  max_bids: int
  start ()
Buyer
  bid (lot, price)
Lot
  lot_id: int
  name: string
  reserve_price: int
  sold_price: int
  sold_date: date
1..*
runs1
auctions
1            1..*
facilitates
1 1..*
owned
1..*
1
0..*
1owns
Valuation
  utility: int
  confidence: float
*
*
Fixed Time
  duration: time
Variable Time
  inactivity: time
Figure 6-2: UML class diagram for the auction process simulator.
From the simulation experiments, the theoretical and simulation results are com-
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Figure 6-3: Average auction duration of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window.
pared, and the agreements are all extremely good. A sample of the graphs comparing
the theoretical and simulation results is given below, where the thick curves are those
obtained from theory and the thin curves are those obtained by simulation.
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Figure 6-4: Average auction duration of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window.
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Figure 6-5: Average auction duration of fixed-time first-price forward auction with
maximum threshold termination.
141
0 1 2
1
2
3
4
Bid Rate
Duration
Theoretical
M = 20.0
M = 40.0
M = 60.0
M = 80.0
Figure 6-6: Average auction duration of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination.
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Figure 6-7: Average auction duration of first-price forward auction with bid enumer-
ation termination.
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Figure 6-8: Average auction income of fixed-time first-price forward auction.
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Figure 6-9: Average auction income of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window.
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Figure 6-10: Average auction income of fixed-time first-price forward auction with
maximum threshold termination.
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Figure 6-11: Average auction income of variable-time first-price forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination.
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Figure 6-12: Average auction income of fixed-time Vickrey forward auction.
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Figure 6-13: Average auction income of variable-time Vickrey forward auction with
fixed inactivity window.
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Figure 6-14: Average auction income of fixed-time Vickrey forward auction with
maximum threshold termination.
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Figure 6-15: Average auction income of variable-time Vickrey forward auction with
fixed inactivity window and maximum threshold termination.
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Figure 6-16: Average auction income of Vickrey forward auction with bid enumeration
termination.
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Figure 6-17: Average auction income of fixed-time last-price reverse auction.
6.2 Comparison with eBay Auction Data
Actual Internet auction data are obtained from eBay for comparison purposes. It is
found that with many of the auctions, the number of bids is not high, often falling
below ten. Among the most popular items are iPhone 4 with different colours, spec-
ifications and varying conditions. eBay auctions tend to be fixed time auctions, and
we extracted the data from five eBay iPhone4 auctions that have at least 15 bids.
These detailed auction data are given in Appendix A.
It must be emphasised that actual live data has a number of drawbacks. Firstly,
unlike simulation experiments, these experimental observations are not reproducible—
they can be somewhat haphazard due to the fact that the prevailing conditions gov-
erning the underlying processes are not experimentally repeatable. In fact, even
in well-studied models such as those in queueing theory, it is generally unlikely to
have the measurements taken from an actual queueing situation exactly matching
the established theoretical results. Secondly, unlike simulation experiments, the ex-
perimental conditions are not under the control of the experimenter.
From these eBay data, we wish to examine the bid arrival pattern, the distribution
of bid values, and the auction income.
We first examine the bid arrival pattern, and the relevant data are given in Ta-
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Figure 6-18: Average auction income of variable-time last-price reverse auction with
fixed inactivity window.
0 1 2
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
Bid Rate
Income
Theoretical
M = 20.0
M = 40.0
M = 60.0
M = 80.0
Figure 6-19: Average auction income of fixed-time last-price reverse auction with
minimum threshold termination.
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Figure 6-20: Average auction income of variable-time last-price reverse auction with
fixed inactivity window and minimum threshold termination.
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Figure 6-21: Average auction income of last-price reverse auction with bid enumera-
tion termination.
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ble 6.1. We note that for Poisson arrival, the inter-arrival time distribution has a
coefficient of variation of one.
From Table 6.1, we see that for auction A1, the coefficient of variation of the
inter-arrival time of 1.01 is very close to one indeed, with an error percentage of
under 1%. For auction A3, the coefficient of variation of the inter-arrival time of 0.93
is also close to one, with an error percentage of around 7.5%. For auction A5, the
coefficient of variation of the inter-arrival time of 1.2 is higher, but the error percentage
of 16.7% is not excessive. The departure from the exponential inter-arrival time is
more pronounced, however, in the cases of auctions A2 and A4. The average of the
observed coefficients of variation of the inter-arrival time is 1.166, which deviates
from the theoretical value by 16.6%, and the average error is 15.23%. However, it
is interesting to note that, in the case of auction A4, when the arrival of the first
three bids are not included, the inter-arrival time of the remaining 18 bids has a
coefficient of variation of 1.032, which is rather close to the Poisson coefficient of
variation. Moreover, in the case of auction A2, when the arrival of the first three bids
are not included, the inter-arrival time of the remaining 14 bids has a coefficient of
variation of 1.116, and also, in the case of auction A5, when the arrival of the three
bids are not included, the inter-arrival time of the remaining 12 bids has a coefficient
of variation of 1.017. It would appear particularly that, in the cases of auctions A4
and A5, while their overall bid arrival patterns are not strictly Poisson, they seem to
converge to the Poisson pattern when some initial transient effects are disregarded.
Column 6 of Table 6.1 shows the coefficients of variation after the transient effects
of A2, A4, and A5 are adjusted with the inter-arrival times of the first three bids
disregarded. The adjusted coefficients of variation have a mean of 1.022, which shows
little deviation from the theoretical average Poisson coefficient of variation of one,
while the corresponding average error is around 4.8%. Column 7 of Table 6.1 shows
the coefficients of variation after the transient effects of all the five auctions are
adjusted with the inter-arrival times of the first three bids disregarded. The adjusted
coefficients of variation have a mean of 1.004, which is very close to one indeed, while
the corresponding average error is around 6.7%. From these observations, it is possible
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Table 6.1: Comparison of observed and theoretical bid patterns.
AuctionStart
Time
End
Time
Bids Observed
coeffi-
cient
of
vari-
ation
of the
inter-
arrival
time
(no
tran-
sient
ef-
fects
ad-
just-
ments)
Observed
coeffi-
cient
of
vari-
ation
of the
inter-
arrival
time
(with
tran-
sient
ef-
fects
ad-
justed
for
A2,
A4,
A5)
Observed
coeffi-
cient
of
vari-
ation
of the
inter-
arrival
time
(with
tran-
sient
ef-
fects
ad-
justed
for
A1,
A2,
A3,
A4,
A5)
Error%
(No
tran-
sient
ef-
fects
ad-
just-
ments)
Error
%
(with
tran-
sient
ef-
fects
ad-
justed
for
A2,
A4,
A5)
Error%
(with
tran-
sient
ef-
fects
ad-
justed
for
A1,
A2,
A3,
A4,
A5)
A1 10
July
2011
18:20
13
July
2011
18:20
16 1.01 1.01 0.85 0.99% 0.99% 17.65%
A2 6 July
2011
18:50
13
July
2011
18:50
19
(Last
16)
1.28 1.12 1.12 21.88% 10.71% 10.71%
A3 8 July
2011
20:00
13
July
2011
20:00
17 0.93 0.93 1.00 7.53% 7.53% 0%
A4 12
July
2011
20:38
13
July
2011
20:38
21
(Last
18)
1.41 1.03 1.03 29.08% 2.91% 2.91%
A5 13
July
2011
3:05
14
July
2011
3:05
15
(Last
12)
1.20 1.02 1.02 16.67% 1.96% 1.96%
Average 1.166 1.022 1.004 15.23% 4.82% 6.65%152
Table 6.2: Comparison of observed and theoretical bid value patterns.
Auction Start Time End Time Bids Observed
coeffi-
cient
of
vari-
ation
of bid
value
Error %
A1 10 July 2011 18:20 13 July 2011 18:20 16 0.68 15.10%
A2 6 July 2011 18:50 13 July 2011 18:50 19 0.64 9.79%
A3 8 July 2011 20:00 13 July 2011 20:00 17 0.61 5.35%
A4 12 July 2011 20:38 13 July 2011 20:38 21 0.55 4.97%
A5 13 July 2011 3:05 14 July 2011 3:05 15 0.62 6.88%
Average 0.62 8.42%
to conclude that the Poisson arrival assumptions is a valid one for at least some of
the actual auction processes, while it can be employed as a useful approximation for
some others.
We next examine the bid value patterns, and the results are given in Table 6.2.
We note that, for uniformly distributed bid values, the coefficient of variation is 0.58.
We see that, with the exception of auction A1, all the other auctions have for the
coefficient of variation of the bid value reasonably close to the theoretical value of 0.58,
all having below 10% error. For auctions A3 and A4, their coefficients of variation
of the bid value are quite close to the theoretical value of 0.58, having only around
5% error. For auction A1, its coefficient of variation of the bid value has a slightly
higher error percentage of 15.1%, but is not excessive. The average of the observed
coefficient of variation of the bid value is 0.62, which deviates from the theoretical
value of 0.58 by 6.88%, and the average error is 8.42%. From these observations, it
is possible to conclude that using uniformly distributed bid values generally provides
a reasonable working approximation for the study of Internet auction processes.
We also compare the auction income for both the first-price forward auction and
the Vickrey auction. The parameter L is estimated from Equation 3.1 with N taken
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Table 6.3: First-price forward auction income.
Auction Start Time End Time Bids Observed
auc-
tion
in-
come
Theoretical
auc-
tion
in-
come
Error %
A1 10 July 2011 18:20 13 July 2011 18:20 16 575 572.8 0.4%
A2 6 July 2011 18:50 13 July 2011 18:50 19 420 418.8 0.3%
A3 8 July 2011 20:00 13 July 2011 20:00 17 475 473.4 0.3%
A4 12 July 2011 20:38 13 July 2011 20:38 21 540 538.8 0.2%
A5 13 July 2011 3:05 14 July 2011 3:05 15 525 522.7 0.4%
Table 6.4: Vickrey auction income.
Auction Start Time End Time Bids Observed
auc-
tion
in-
come
Theoretical
auc-
tion
in-
come
Error %
A1 10 July 2011 18:20 13 July 2011 18:20 16 565 534.6 5.4%
A2 6 July 2011 18:50 13 July 2011 18:50 19 410 395.6 3.5%
A3 8 July 2011 20:00 13 July 2011 20:00 17 470 443.7 5.6%
A4 12 July 2011 20:38 13 July 2011 20:38 21 530 511.8 3.4%
A5 13 July 2011 3:05 14 July 2011 3:05 15 515 485.3 5.8%
to be the number of bids. Since λT gives the average number of bids, the parameter
λ is estimated by the number of bids divided by the auction duration. The results
are given in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. We see that the agreement is generally good, with
error percentage below 6%.
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Table 6.5: Simulation using eBay parameters for first-price forward auctions.
Auction L λ T Auction
in-
come
(sim-
ula-
tion)
Auction
in-
come
(eBay)
Error %
A1 610.97 0.222 72 572.75 575 0.39%
A2 442.11 0.113 168 418.82 420 0.28%
A3 502.94 0.142 120 473.42 475 0.33%
A4 565.71 0.875 24 538.77 540 0.23%
A5 560.00 0.625 24 522.66 525 0.44%
Table 6.6: Simulation using eBay parameters for Vickrey auctions.
Auction L λ T Auction
in-
come
(sim-
ula-
tion)
Auction
in-
come
(eBay)
Error %
A1 610.97 0.222 72 534.52 565 5.39%
A2 442.11 0.113 168 395.53 410 3.53%
A3 502.94 0.142 120 443.91 470 5.55%
A4 565.71 0.875 24 511.83 530 3.43%
A5 560.00 0.625 24 485.33 515 5.76%
6.3 Simulations using eBay-determined Parame-
ters
We also carry out simulations using the parameters as estimated from the eBay data
above and the results are given in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6. We also see that the
agreement is generally good.
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Chapter 7
Sensitivity Analysis of the Auction
Income With Respect to Different
Independent Values Distributions
As we have seen, the Independent Private Values (IPV) model plays a fundamental
role in the analyses of Internet auction performance. This model assumes privacy and
independence, meaning that the private values of buyers are drawn from a common
distribution, or in probabilistic terms, the series of values are independent and identi-
cally distributed. In this chapter, we shall study the sensitivity of the auction income
with respect to different Independent Values Distributions and their appropriateness
for Internet auctions. We shall also provide analytic approximations to the auction
income for different Independent Values Distributions by introducing the damping
factor which modifies the bid rate.
7.1 Importance of the Uniform Distribution for
Independent Private Values
The uniform distribution for private values is commonly employed in auction studies
(Katok and Kwasnica, 2008). It possesses the following desirable features that are
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widely used to characterise Internet auction behaviour.
1. It is naturally capped by a finite value: in most auctions, the private values do
not go to infinity but is bounded by a certain upper limit. Since bids can often
start at a very low value, the range of values permitted by uniformly private
values may be presented by (0, L), so that with the probability that a bid falling
into a small value interval is given by Pr[x < Qj < x+ ∆x] = ∆x/L.
2. It represents that no information is available and no bias exists concerning the
inclinations and behaviour of the underlying bidder group, as well as no inter-
action or correlation between bids: any value is possible and they happen with
equal probability. This property is also useful in expressing a wide cross-section
of bidder valuation spreading over different geographical regions, disparate cul-
tures, personal preferences and perceptions—typically found on the Internet—
and with little or no communication or agreements among the bidders.
Key performance metrics are the average income per auction and the average
duration of an auction. Since for hard close auctions, the auction duration is fixed,
this quantity is of interest mainly for the soft close case, where the duration is a
random variable. For each parameter setting, we carry out 100 auction experiments
and the measurements collected are averaged. Figure 7-1 shows the average auction
income for different values of λ for hard close auctions when T = 10, and L = 100.
We see that the increase in bid rate up to about λ = 1 produces rather steep average
auction income improvement. There seems to be a critical bid rate at around λ = 1,
above which the improvement in income becomes less pronounced.
Figure 7-2 shows how auction income varies for soft close auctions with λ for
α = 1, 2, 3 and 4. We see that average auction income increases gradually for small
values of λ, but accelerates for large values. As the bid rate increases, there is reduced
chance of a no bid interval occurring, and the difference between α = 1 and α = 4
tends to widen as λ → 1, but slowly narrows afterwards, especially between α = 2,
α = 3 and α = 4. Depending on the specified length of the no bid interval α, the
auction duration for soft close auctions can show considerable divergence for high bid
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Figure 7-1: Auction income for uniformly distributed private values for hard close
auctions.
rate, which is shown in Figure 7-3. We observe that for larger values of α (e.g. α = 4),
it can shoot up to very large values for high bid rates, which seems to be due the fact
that under such circumstances, having no arriving bid in an interval of α = 4 becomes
increasingly unattainable, leading to almost an indefinite continuation of the auction.
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Figure 7-2: Auction income for uniformly distributed private values for soft close
auctions.
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Figure 7-3: Auction duration for uniformly distributed private values for soft close
auctions.
7.2 Exponentially distributed private values
The exponential distribution µe−µv is one of the most widely used distributions in
stochastic modelling. Compared with the uniform distribution, it has an added nat-
ural advantage of representing private values since private values are not allowed to
go negative, and the exponential random variable is always positive. Since for the
exponential distribution, the smaller values has a higher probability of occurring than
higher values, i.e. for u < v and an arbitrary interval of length k,
Pr [u ≤ Qi ≤ u+ k] =
∫ u+k
u
µe−µtdt
>
Pr [v ≤ Qi ≤ v + k] =
∫ v+k
v
µe−µtdt,
which is a consequence of the inequality e−µu > e−µv. Thus the exponential private
values distribution represents a situation where people are looking for bargains from
the auction, since the lower values are favoured. Figures 7-4 and 7-5 give the auction
performance of the exponentially distributed private values; for effective comparison
with the uniformly distributed private values, here we set 1/µ = L/2 = 50. The
graph for the auction duration for soft close auctions is omitted as it is the same as
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Figure 7-3, because the bid arrival process is independent of the private values. We see
that the average auction income I for hard close auctions increases rather steeply at
first but the increase slows down for higher bid rate. This is interesting as, unlike the
uniform distribution, there is no cap on the private values. Again, unlike the uniform
distribution, where the auction income is bounded by L = 100, the auction income
here reaches to well over 200. For the soft close cases, it is particularly noteworthy
to observe that, unlike the nonlinear behaviour for hard close auctions, the average
auction income here increases approximately linearly with respect to the bid rate. In
fact, for α = 2, the average auction income appears to follow the relationship:
I = 100× λ. (7.1)
Indeed, more generally, the relationship between income and bid rate appears to
follow the equation:
I =
αλ
µ
. (7.2)
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Figure 7-4: Auction income for exponentially distributed private values for hard close
auctions.
As it stands, however, the ordinary exponential distribution in representing private
values is not sufficiently realistic as it allows arbitrarily large values to be used, which
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Figure 7-5: Auction income for exponentially distributed private values for soft close
auctions.
is often not the case for practical auction processes. For example, for α = 4, the
average highest bid can go up to 400, which is over four times the auction income for
the uniformly distributed private values case, even though both have the same mean
private value. For a more realistic representation of private values, we make use of
the truncated exponential distribution over the same interval as the uniform case,
namely, the interval (0, L), i.e.
f(v) =
µe−µv
1− e−µL , for 0 < v < L, (7.3)
and vanishes outside the interval (0, L). Figures 7-6 and 7-7 give the auction
performance for truncated exponentially distributed private values. We see that the
performance behaviour of the ordinary exponential distribution and the truncated
exponential distribution is rather different. However, there is a remarkable similarity
in the auction income behaviour between the truncated exponential private values
and the uniform private values. In the uniform case, the ceiling of 100 is approached
faster than in the truncated exponential case, which as indicated above may be due
to the fact that the bidders in this case is looking for bargains and there is a greater
tendency (probability) to bid for the lower values than the higher ones, whereas in
the uniform case, all the values happen equally likely.
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Figure 7-6: Auction income for truncated exponentially distributed private values for
hard close auctions.
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Figure 7-7: Auction income for truncated exponentially distributed private values for
soft close auctions.
7.3 Normally distributed private values
The normal distribution is highly versatile and is representative of a variety of social
and physical phenomena. Here, it represents some measure of implicit agreement
concerning the value of the auction item among the bidder population, since there
is a mode value which they roughly agree upon. In addition, there may even be
some degree of indirect interaction or communication among the global community of
bidders, perhaps through various forms of social networking. Here, we take the mean
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of the normal distribution η to correspond to the mean of the uniform distribution,
which is L/2 = 50, and likewise we take the variance σ2 to also correspond to the
variance of the uniform distribution, which is L2/12 = 833.33.
Figures 7-8 and 7-9 give the auction performance of the normally distributed pri-
vate values. We see that, while the auction income definitely goes above 100, it is
much more subdued compared with the exponential case for hard close auctions. Sim-
ilar performance behaviour is also evident for soft close auctions. These are probably
due to the strong clustering around the mean/mode. Unlike the exponential case,
however, there is no simple linearity relationship observed, but rather a sub-linear
relationship may be inferred.
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Figure 7-8: Auction income for normally distributed private values for hard close
auctions.
However, the ordinary normal distribution has two properties which limits its
usefulness for auction processes. First, it can go up to +∞, which as indicated earlier
for the exponential distribution, is often not realistic. Second, it can go down to −∞,
which means that negative values are unavoidable no matter how far we shift the
mean to the right, and this again is not permitted in auction processes. As for the
exponential case, we make use of the truncated normal distribution confined to the
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Figure 7-9: Auction income for normally distributed private values for soft close
auctions.
interval (0, L), i.e.
f(v) =
exp
[
− (v−η)2
2σ2
]
K
√
2piσ2
, for 0 < v < L, (7.4)
but vanishes outside the interval (0, L), and K is the constant
K =
1√
2piσ2
∫ L
0
exp
[
−(t− η)
2
2σ2
]
dt. (7.5)
Figures 7-10 and 7-11 give the auction performance for truncated normally dis-
tributed private values. Here, we also see that the performance behaviour of the
ordinary normal distribution and the truncated normal distribution is rather differ-
ent, and there is also a remarkable similarity in the auction income behaviour between
the truncated normal private values and the uniform private values. Similar to the
remarks for the truncated exponential case, in the truncated normal case, the ceiling
of 100 is approached slower than in the uniform case which may be due to the clus-
tering of values around the mean/mode that limits its scope in going up to very high
private values.
We thus see that in the modelling of private values, the uniform distribution as
well as the truncated versions of the normal and exponential distributions are more
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Figure 7-10: Auction income for truncated normally distributed private values for
hard close auctions.
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Figure 7-11: Auction income for truncated normally distributed private values for
soft close auctions.
realistic and versatile. The average auction incomes for these three distributions
exhibit similar behaviour in response to the bid level. It is interesting to compare
how quickly the ceiling of L is approached in these cases. Table 7.1 shows the different
bid rates in attaining 70%, 80%, and 90% of the ceiling L for the hard close auctions.
From the sellers’ point of view, the preferred private values distribution is the uniform,
since it attains a high average income more quickly than the other two distributions.
The least preferred is the truncated exponential distribution since it is the slowest
among the three private values distribution to attain high average income, probably
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Table 7.1: Comparison of the Rates of Convergence to the Ceiling L
Private Values Distribution 0.7L 0.8L 0.9L
Uniform λ = 0.3 λ = 0.5 λ = 1
Truncated exponential λ = 0.6 λ = 1 λ = 2.5
Truncated normal λ = 0.4 λ = 0.7 λ = 1.9
due to the reluctance of the underlying bidder community in bidding reasonable
values.
7.4 Sensitivity of the Auction Income to the Bid
Rate and the Damping Factor
In view of the above observation, and the resemblance of the shape of the truncated
exponential and truncated normal IPV auction incomes with that of the uniform IPV
auction income, we infer that the behaviour of auctions with the truncated exponential
and truncated normal IPV may be approximated by that of the uniform IPV, with
the bid rate reduced by a damping factor b < 1. Thus modifying Equation 3.3 for
the fixed time first-price auction, we have
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
bλT
(
bλT + e−bλT − 1
)
. (7.6)
For T = 10, L = 100, Figure 7-12 compares the above formula with the truncated
exponential experimental values for b = 1/2, and we see that the agreement is quite
close.
Modifying the fixed time Vickrey auction equation in the same way, we have
E
[
Q(N−1)
]
=
L
bλT
(
bλT + bλTe−bλT + 2e−bλT − 2
)
. (7.7)
Figure 7-13 compares the above formula with the truncated exponential experi-
mental values for b = 1/2, and we see that the agreement, while not as close as the
first-price case, is still quite good.
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Figure 7-12: Analytic formula for the truncated exponentially distributed IPV for
first-price auctions.
The damping factor applied to λ represents a fractional reduction in bid traffic,
and hence a damping factor less than one indicates that, compared with the uni-
formly distributed IPV, the corresponding traffic gives a lesser auction income than
the uniformly distributed IPV. The damping factor of b = 1/2 for the truncated
exponential is a significant reduction, and as remarked earlier, it represents bidders
who are looking for bargains and are less generous than those with the corresponding
uniformly distributed private values. Indeed, it is useful to compare the generosity
characteristics of the two distributions. Denoting by Qexp the truncated exponential
IPV bids, and Quniform the uniform IPV bids, we have for v < L,
Pr [Qexp < v] =
1− eµv
1− e−µL (7.8)
Pr [Quniform < v] =
v
L
(7.9)
Since the truncated exponential IPV tend to have bids clustering more at the
lower end compared with the uniform IPV, therefore the relative generosity of the
uniform IPV may be indicated by the probability of a bid exceeding a certain value v
Pr [Qexp > v] < Pr [Quniform > v] , (7.10)
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which is equivalent to
Pr [Quniform < v] < Pr [Qexp < v] , (7.11)
That is,
1− e−µv
v
>
1− e−µv
L
. (7.12)
Since L > v, thus condition (Equation 7.10) will be true if we can show that the
function
f(x) =
1− e−µv
x
. (7.13)
is a decreasing function, i.e. the derivative f ′(x) < 0. Now
f ′(x) =
e−µx(1 + µx)− 1
x2
. (7.14)
Since (1 + µx)/ exp(µx) < 1, we see that f ′(x) < 0, and so establishing condition
(Equation 7.10), showing that adopting the truncated exponential IPV is more frugal
than the uniform IPV.
As for the truncated normal distribution for the IPV, Figure 7-14 compares Equa-
tion 7.6 with the corresponding truncated normal experimental values for b = 2/3,
and we also see that the agreement is quite close. Also, Figure 7-15 compares Equa-
tion 7.7 with the corresponding truncated normal experimental values for b = 2/3,
and we observe that the agreement, while not as close as the first-price case, seems
quite workable as an approximation.
Thus, we see that both for the truncated exponential and truncated normal IPVs,
the auction income may be usefully approximated by Equations 7.6 and 7.7 respec-
tively for the first-price and Vickrey auctions with appropriate damping factor b. In
both of these cases, the damping factor is less than one, with that for the truncated
exponential distribution smaller than that for the truncated normal distribution. Of
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Figure 7-13: Analytic formula for the truncated exponentially distributed IPV for
Vickrey auctions.
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Figure 7-14: Analytic formula for the truncated normally distributed IPV for first-
price auctions.
course, in the case of the uniform distribution, b = 1.
7.5 Summary
We have studied the sensitivity of the auction income to the form of the IPV distribu-
tions. To be realistic, we focus attention on those admitting a finite range of positive
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Figure 7-15: Analytic formula for the truncated normally distributed IPV for Vickrey
auctions.
values, which include the uniform, truncated normal, and truncated exponential dis-
tributions. The uniform distribution may be used to represent bidders of whose IPV
very little is known, with all values within the range occurring with equal probability.
On the other hand, the truncated normal distribution may be used to represent the
community of bidders in which there is some degree of agreement on the value of
the item being auctioned. Since consumers are often looking for bargains in Internet
auctions (as opposed to obtaining the good through conventional channels), many
tend to bid at the lower end of the spectrum of values, and such social behaviour
may be represented by the truncated exponential IPV distribution, where the lower
value clusters have a greater probability of occurring. For these distributions, we have
found that their performances exhibit a remarkable similarity in their pattern of in-
crease. In all such IPV distributions, the average auction income tends to rise rather
steeply at first and then gradually settles to approach the ceiling value. Using the
damping factor which suitably reduces the bid rate, analytic formulae are obtained
for the auction incomes for auctions which adopt the truncated exponential IPV and
truncated normal IPV. We have found that the uniform IPV is the most generous
with a damping factor of one. The truncated normal IPV is more frugal than the
uniform IPV with a smaller damping factor, while the most frugal of the three is the
171
truncated exponential IPV which has the smallest damping factor compared with the
other IPV distributions.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Summary of Achievements
The present study provides the first systems model of Internet Auction Processes. It
is able to give good prediction of Internet auction performance, and the closed-form
analytic results are able to furnish fairly good agreements with observed measure-
ments.
The value of such model may be usefully compared with those of Queueing Sys-
tems. While actual queueing systems in general admit considerable complexity such
as transient behaviour, inter-dependent arrivals, rush hour characteristics, corre-
lated service times, diverse scheduling rules etc., tractable and manageable system
model such as the M/G/1 steady state queue (along with the well-known Pollazcek-
Khintchine formula) nevertheless provides useful quantitative results as well as valu-
able insights and approximations into the performance and behavioural characteris-
tics of queueing systems, even though the M/G/1 queue is recognised to be a gross
simplification of reality. Similar to Kendall’s notation for queueing systems, we can
characterise Internet Auction Processes in terms of a set of properties.
The first is the arrival characteristics; e.g. as in queueing theory, we may use M to
denote homogeneous Poisson (Markov) arrival, and M(t) to denote non-homogeneous
Poisson arrival.
The second is the distribution of the private values; e.g. we may use U to signify
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that the values are uniformly distributed, N to signify that the values are normally
distributed, and M to signify that the values are exponentially distributed. Since pri-
vate values are bounded, it is often more realistic to use the corresponding truncated
distributions for N and M . Therefore the corresponding truncated distribution is
assumed to be used whenever we indicate N or M .
The third is the relative ranking of the accepted bid; e.g. we may use FP to denote
first-price auctions, V K to denote Vickrey auctions, and LP to denote lowest price
auctions.
The fourth is the intended auction duration; e.g. we may use FT to denote fixed-
time auctions, and V T to denote variable-time auctions.
The fifth is whether there is the option of early termination of an auction, e.g. on
receiving a sufficiently high bid (such as Buy-It-Now or BIN) or a sufficiently low bid
(Sell-It-Now or SIN); when such early termination option is not available, then we
would simply omit this specification, meaning that the auction will always be allowed
to run its normal course to completion. In the case where the auction is designed to
terminate on receiving a pre-specified number of bids k, then we would simply use k
to indicate this in the fifth component.
For example, a first-price auction with Poisson arrival, uniformly distributed pri-
vate values, which uses a fixed auction duration but allows early termination at the
point when a sufficiently large bid is received is denoted by M/U/FP/FT/BIN .
A comparison between some of the attributes of Internet Auction Systems and
Queueing Systems is useful (see Table 8.1).
Internet Auction Systems Queueing Systems
Independent Values Distribution Service Time Distribution
Price Selection Criterion (e.g. First-Price) Customer Selection Criterion (e.g. FCFS)
Number of Bids Accepted Number of Servers
Auction Duration (exceeding which no bid
is allowed)
Waiting Room Capacity (exceeding which
no customer is allowed)
Premature Auction Termination Service Preemption
Bid Arrival Pattern Customer Arrival Pattern
Table 8.1: Comparison Between Internet Auction Systems and Queueing Systems.
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We have obtained closed-form solutions to the following systems:
1. M/U/FP/FT
2. M/U/FP/V T
3. M/U/FP/FT/BIN
4. M/U/FP/V T/BIN
5. M/U/FP/V T/k
6. M/U/V K/FT
7. M/U/V K/V T
8. M/U/V K/FT/BIN
9. M/U/V K/V T/BIN
10. M/U/V K/V T/k
11. M/U/LP/FT
12. M/U/LP/V T
13. M/U/LP/FT/SIN
14. M/U/LP/V T/SIN
15. M/U/LP/V T/k
In addition, through the introduction of damping factors, we have also obtained
analytic approximations to the following:
16. M/M/FP/FT
17. M/M/VK/FT
18. M/N/FP/FT
175
19. M/N/V K/FT
Moreover, through appropriately transforming the timescale, we have been able
to generalise most of the above results from a homogeneous Poisson arrival pattern
of M to a non-homogeneous arrival pattern of M(t), which is able to model a wide
variety of bid arrival characteristics in a versatile manner.
8.2 Optimal Auction Scenarios
From this thesis, I have learned auctions algorithms on the Internet have room for
incorporating greater complexity. Some of the algorithms studied here are more
complex than the existing Internet algorithms (e.g. Algorithms 3.3 and 3.4), and if
users are willing to accept such complexity, these can be incorporated into Internet
auctions.
The optimal auction scenario from the point-of-view of the seller is to run a fixed-
time Vickrey auction, since Vickrey auctions encourage bidder participation, and
consequently higher bid rates translate to higher incomes. Additionally, a high bid
rate will narrow the price difference between the first-price and second price anyway.
Choosing a fixed-time auction makes it easier to manage and as the seller, I can be
assured of getting the money by a specific time rather than having to wait for a period
of uncertain length in the case of a soft-close auction. The length of the auction will
be so chosen that the expected income is higher than my target surplus.
The optimal auction scenario from the point-of-view of the buyer is to participate
in an auction with Open BIN (either hard-close or soft-close) where M is lower than
the price I am willing to pay. Doing so will mean that I can get the resource quickly
without having to wait for the auction to finish. If such an auction is not available,
I would choose a Vickrey auction, where I get the assurance that I won’t overpay
compared with other bidders.
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8.3 Future Work
As for queueing systems, the varieties and types of Internet Auction processes admit
wide variations, and the characteristics and performance of different such auction
systems will clearly be worthy of further study. In future, some of the components of
Internet Auction Systems may be extended to characterise different auction situations
and algorithms. Unlike conventional auctions, arbitrarily complex auction algorithms
may be designed and adopted for Internet Auctions.
While the probability distributional assumptions that we use have been commonly
adopted in other studies, it will be useful in particular to extend the Independent
Private Values characteristics to other distributions for modelling the behaviour of
different types of bidding communities. For example, it will be interesting to gen-
eralise the above results to such widely-used distributions as the Erlang distribution
and the Pareto distribution.
Indeed, any one of the five components of an Internet auction system may be
usefully generalised and extended. Admittedly, however, exact results may not be
easy to obtain, and approximations would have to be used. Such approximations may
relate to the adoption of assumptions that are close but not completely matching the
particular situations, or approximations that are related to the mathematical analysis
of the model or both. Such approximate expressions, even though do not give a full
and complete correspondence with the underlying reality, will nevertheless be able
to provide useful insight into the operation of Internet auction processes and furnish
mechanisms for the practical optimisation of the relevant auction parameters.
Since Internet auctions is becoming prevalent and ubiquitous, with significant
parts of the commodities and resources markets based on auctions rather than the
fixed-price model, the systematic quantitative study of Internet auction models will be
increasingly useful and essential to impart a deeper understanding of the performance
behaviour of such processes and mechanisms.
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Appendix A
eBay Auction Data
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Table A.1: Auction of “Apple iPhone 4 16GB- BLACK- UNLOCKED JAILBRO-
KEN, NEW!!!” to “ ***n” for USD575.00.
Bid Date Bid Time Bidder Private Value Time Between Bids (s)
7/13/2011 18:20
7/13/2011 18:07 ***n 575.00
7/13/2011 02:29 h***h 565.00 56268
7/12/2011 21:53 k***e 540.00 16559
7/12/2011 18:40 i***r 450.00 11602
7/12/2011 13:42 i***i 300.00 17867
7/12/2011 06:01 a***a 265.00 27649
7/12/2011 03:23 0***9 250.50 9465
7/11/2011 14:03 e***2 230.00 48021
7/11/2011 07:45 o***p 220.00 22651
7/11/2011 03:45 y***a 220.00 14439
7/11/2011 00:17 i***k 200.00 12451
7/11/2011 00:12 d***n 110.00 310
7/10/2011 20:28 r***y 75.00 13445
7/10/2011 20:09 m***s 50.00 1144
7/10/2011 18:55 l***t 189.23 4421
7/10/2011 18:45 n***c 3.00 635
7/10/2011 18:20 1468
180
Table A.2: Auction of “Apple iPhone 4 WHITE 16GB UNLOCKED JAILBROKEN
BOXED 4.3” to “k***k” for GBP420.00.
Bid Date Bid Time Bidder Private Value Time Between Bids (s)
7/13/2011 18:50
7/13/2011 15:09 k***k 420.00
7/13/2011 11:36 e***t 345.00 12775
7/13/2011 00:55 m***r 410.00 38494
7/12/2011 18:16 9***9 272.00 23919
7/11/2011 18:07 i***i 262.00 86925
7/10/2011 16:30 a***o 240.00 92269
7/09/2011 03:26 s***u 210.00 133400
7/09/2011 03:04 1***2 325.00 1347
7/08/2011 02:21 a***b 200.00 88989
7/08/2011 00:49 e***i 195.00 5475
7/07/2011 19:24 t***h 183.00 19510
7/07/2011 13:48 o***b 175.00 20192
7/07/2011 13:33 0***1 165.00 885
7/07/2011 01:42 y***0 145.00 42674
7/06/2011 22:44 e***i 100.00 10671
7/06/2011 20:17 c***o 11 .00 8812
7/06/2011 19:50 i***h 50 .00 1631
7/06/2011 19:38 m***i 10 .00 710
7/06/2011 19:28 5***i 10 .00 627
7/06/2011 18:50 2240
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Table A.3: Auction of “NEW! iPhone 4 16GB black JAILBROKEN!!! + FREE
APPS” to “a***a” for USD475.00.
Bid Date Bid Time Bidder Private Value Time Between Bids (s)
7/13/2011 20:00
7/13/2011 20:00 a***a 475.00
7/13/2011 18:39 0***8 470.00 4850
7/13/2011 18:21 o***i 417.00 1093
7/13/2011 17:15 i***i 430.00 3943
7/13/2011 15:09 m***r 355.00 7545
7/13/2011 07:45 a***s 350.00 26668
7/13/2011 02:47 e***s 310.00 17871
7/12/2011 18:15 s***i 220.00 30729
7/12/2011 16:59 k***n 210.00 4539
7/12/2011 13:30 y***r 185.00 12531
7/12/2011 01:34 a***1 180.00 42967
7/11/2011 04:06 h***m 120.00 77308
7/10/2011 10:24 s***n 115.00 63700
7/10/2011 05:37 i***9 100.00 17215
7/10/2011 01:07 n***v 100.00 16208
7/09/2011 06:14 s***i 25 .00 67953
7/09/2011 00:37 p***n 75 .00 20222
7/08/2011 20:00 16655
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Table A.4: Auction of “Apple iPhone 4 16GB new” to “c***o” for USD540.00.
Bid Date Bid Time Bidder Private Value Time Between Bids (s)
7/13/2011 20:38
7/13/2011 18:31 c***o 540.00
7/13/2011 15:53 b***a 500.00 9503
7/13/2011 13:25 u***1 450.00 8882
7/13/2011 10:58 i***k 530.00 8818
7/13/2011 08:59 i***n 410.00 7130
7/13/2011 08:41 n***e 405.00 1066
7/13/2011 07:59 1***a 380.00 2500
7/13/2011 07:26 n***d 360.00 1997
7/13/2011 07:09 a***a 400.00 1052
7/13/2011 07:07 t***i 300.00 81
7/13/2011 06:23 l***a 350.00 2649
7/13/2011 05:30 i***r 255.00 3169
7/13/2011 05:11 d***o 240.00 1128
7/13/2011 05:02 0***r 250.00 582
7/13/2011 04:06 0***e 200.00 3323
7/13/2011 03:22 3***e 192.00 2636
7/13/2011 03:08 n***6 90 .00 880
7/13/2011 03:02 r***n 170.00 335
7/13/2011 03:00 n***c 45 .00 153
7/13/2011 02:54 z***n 40.00 335
7/13/2011 02:53 r***x 20.00 72
7/12/2011 20:38 22490
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Table A.5: Auction of “Apple iPhone 4 (Latest Model) - 16GB - White (AT&T)
NEW” to “a***d” for USD525.00.
Bid Date Bid Time Bidder Private Value Time Between Bids (s)
7/14/2011 03:05
7/14/2011 03:05 a***d 525.00
7/14/2011 03:04 p***p 515.00 27
7/13/2011 22:29 j***m 496.00 16505
7/13/2011 18:56 i***i 485.01 12815
7/13/2011 17:44 a***c 350.00 4310
7/13/2011 14:40 s***f 320.00 11011
7/13/2011 13:22 a***m 450.00 4716
7/13/2011 07:37 g***1 290.00 20677
7/13/2011 04:24 k***a 260.00 11595
7/13/2011 04:17 e***e 300.99 426
7/13/2011 04:16 h***h 250.00 62
7/13/2011 03:51 y***e 70 .00 1510
7/13/2011 03:34 i***h 50 .00 1010
7/13/2011 03:14 8***m 27 .00 1158
7/13/2011 03:12 l***d 26 .00 118
7/13/2011 03:05 460
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Appendix B
Generalisation to
Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process
While many previous studies modelled the bid arrival process as a Poisson process
with constant arrival rate λ, a more versatile model will be to allow λ to be a function
of time, i.e.
Pr[an arrival occurring in (t, t+ ∆t)] ≈ λ(t)∆t. (B.1)
In such a process, the number of bid arrivals in the time interval (t, t + ∆t) is
still independent of what happens in other time intervals. This process is known
by various names such as non-homogeneous Poisson process, non-stationary Poisson
process, time-dependent Poisson process, and in our study, the term non-homogeneous
Poisson process will be used. To generalise on the results of Chapter 3, we need to
replace the number of bids N by N(t), which signifies the number of bids arrived in
the time interval (0, t), and denoting by R(t), the following integral
R(t) =
∫ t
0
λ(x)dx,
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from Mieghem (2006), we have the non-homogeneous Poisson distribution
Pr[N(t) = k] =
e−R(t)R(t)k
k!
, (B.2)
the mean value of which is given by R(t).
B.1 Algorithm I: Fixed Time Forward Auction
To determine the average income E[QN(T )] for the present situation, we remove the
condition on N(t) in Equation 3.1 using the probabilities in Equation B.2 with t = T ;
i.e.
E
[
QN(T )
]
=
∞∑
N(T )=1
N(T )L
N(T ) + 1
× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
=
∞∑
N(T )=1
[
L− L
N(T ) + 1
]
× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
=
∞∑
N(T )=1
L× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
−
∞∑
N(T )=1
L
N(T ) + 1
× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
= L
(
1− e−R(T )
)
− Le
−R(T )
R(T )
∞∑
N(T )=1
R(T )N(T )+1
(N(T ) + 1)!
= L
(
1− e−R(T )
)
− Le
−R(T )
R(T )
(
eR(T ) − 1−R(T )
)
which simplifies to
E
[
QN(T )
]
=
L
R(T )
(
R(T ) + e−R(T ) − 1
)
,
i.e.
E
[
QN(T )
]
=
L
{(∫ T
0 λ(x)dx
)
+
[
exp
(
− ∫ T0 λ(x)dx)]− 1}∫ T
0 λ(x)dx
, (B.3)
Fixed time auctions are particularly susceptible to sniping where the closing time
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of an auction is known in advance. This may be modelled by
λ(t) = Aeωt, (B.4)
where A > 0, and, while ω may be positive or negative, the case ω > 0 may be
used to represent sniping situations since the bid arrival rate climbs steeply towards
the end of the auction.
In this case, Equation B.3 becomes
E
[
QN(T )
]
=
L
{(∫ T
0 Ae
ωxdx
)
+
[
exp
(
− ∫ T0 Aeωxdx)]− 1}∫ T
0 Ae
ωxdx
,
This gives
E
[
QN(T )
]
=
L
A (eωT − 1)
[
A
(
eωT − 1
)
+ ω exp
[
A
ω
(
eωT − 1
)]
− ω
]
. (B.5)
B.2 Algorithm II: Variable Time Forward Auc-
tions with Fixed Inactivity Window
The generalisation of Algorithm II is complicated by the fact that, since the bid arrival
process is time-dependent, the recursive arguments of Equation 3.6 cannot be applied.
However, we shall make use of an important property of the non-homogeneous Poisson
process (Mieghem, 2006), namely, that by transforming the time scale from the t-axis
to a new u-axis using the transformation
u =
∫ t
0
λ(x)dx = R(t),
so that under the new time scale u, we have a homogeneous Poisson process with
unit rate; i.e. if λ′ signifies the new Poisson rate on the u-axis, we have λ′ = 1. Thus,
by carrying out the analysis like before under the new time scale, all the previous
arguments will carry through, and then we can inverse transform the results back to
the original time scale t.
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Under the transformed time scale, the parameter α will become α′, with
α′ =
∫ α
0
λ(x)dx = R(α), (B.6)
and under this transformed time scale, the auction duration from Equation 3.7,
bearing in mind that the rate of the process is now unity, is
τ ′α′ = e
α′ − 1 = eR(α) − 1. (B.7)
Hence, the required auction duration τα satisfies
R(τα) = e
R(α) − 1. (B.8)
Or in terms of the inverse function
τα = R
−1 [eR(α) − 1] . (B.9)
From Equation B.8 we may determine τα from the following equation
∫ τα
0
λ(x)dx = exp
(∫ α
0
λ(x)dx
)
− 1. (B.10)
which, in general, may be solved by numerical methods. For certain simple cases,
closed form solutions may be obtained. For example, in the simple case λ(t) = bt,
then we have from Equation B.10
bτ 2α
2
= e
ba2
2 − 1.
giving
τα =
√√√√2e ba22 − 2
b
.
Here, we have λ(0) = 0, which may sometimes be restrictive. For a more general
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linear form λ(t) = a + bt, the solution to τα is more complicated but still admits a
closed-form solution. Here, we have
R(τα) =
∫ τα
0
(a+ bx)dx = aτα +
bτ 2α
2
.
To determine the inverse function R−1, we let y = R(τα), and solve for τα in terms
of y. That is,
y = ατα +
bτ 2α
2
,
which gives
bτ 2α + 2ατα − 2y = 0.
Solving this using the quadratic formula, we have
τα =
−2a±√4a2 + 8by
2b
.
Taking the positive square root and simplifying, we have
τα =
−a+√a2 + 2by
b
.
That is,
R−1(y) =
−a+√a2 + 2by
b
.
From Equation B.9, we have
τα = R
−1 [eR(α) − 1] = −a+
√
a2 + 2b [eR(α) − 1]
b
.
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That is, we obtain
τα = R
−1 [eR(α) − 1] = −a+
√
a2 + 2b [eaα+bα2/2 − 1]
b
. (B.11)
It is useful to note that as b → 0, λ → a, the limit of the right hand side of
Equation B.11 tends to (eaα − 1) /a, which can be seen by application of L’Hoˆpital’s
rule, and this result is in agreement with Equation 3.7.
For
λ(t) = Aeωt,
from B.10, we have
∫ τα
0
Aeωxdx = exp
(∫ α
0
Aeωxdx
)
− 1, (B.12)
i.e.
Aeωτα
ω
=
[
exp
(∫ α
0
Aeωα
ω
)]
− 1 + A
ω
or
eωτα =
ω
A
[
exp
(
A
ω
(eωα − 1)
)]
− ω
A
+ 1
giving
τα =
1
ω
loge
(
ω
A
[
exp
(
A
ω
(eωα − 1)
)]
− ω
A
+ 1
)
.
We also note that as ω → 0, λ → A, and τα tends to
(
eAα − 1
)
/A, which can
be seen most readily from Equation B.12, and this result is in agreement with Equa-
tion 3.7.
Since bidding sometimes takes place more frequently at certain times of day but
less so at other times, a periodic λ(t) may be usefully employed to model this situation;
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here we may take
λ(t) = A1 cos(ωt− φ) + A0. (B.13)
From B.10, we have
∫ τα
0
(A1 cos(ωx− φ) + A0) dx = exp
(∫ α
0
(A1 cos(ωx− φ) + A0) dx
)
− 1,
i.e.
A1 (sin (ωτα − φ) + sinφ)
ω
+ A0τα = e
(A1/ω)(sin(ωα−φ)+sinφ)+A0α − 1,
from which τα may be solved numerically. In the special case φ = 0, the above
simplifies to
A1 sinωτα
ω
+ A0τα = e
(A1 sinωα/ω)+A0α − 1, (B.14)
For example, if A0 = 2, A1 = 1, ω = 1, and α = pi, Equation B.14 becomes
2τα + sin τα = e
2pi − 1
Solving for τα numerically gives τα = 267.5. It is interesting to note that when
A1 = 0, then λ(t) = A0 and Equation B.14 becomes
A0τα = e
A0α − 1,
which is in agreement with Equation 3.7.
In general, the inverse function would be difficult to obtain, but if λ(t) is a mono-
tonic function, then useful bounds may be obtained. For example, if λ(t) is mono-
tonically increasing with λ(0) ≤ λ(t), then since we know from previous analysis of
Algorithm II that the auction duration is an increasing function of λ, thus the auction
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duration, from Equation 3.7, will be bounded below by
τα ≥ e
λ(0)α − 1
λ(0)
.
Likewise if λ(t) is monotonically decreasing with λ(0) ≥ λ(t), then the auction
duration, from Equation 3.7, will be bounded above by
τα ≤ e
λ(0)α − 1
λ(0)
.
As for the auction income, we note that in the homogeneous Poisson case, the
income depends on α only through the probabilities (Equation 3.8). Thus, unlike
the auction duration where constants also need to be transformed (e.g. a duration
of 1second in the t-axis will not necessarily be 1 second in the u-axis), here our
conversion need to only concentrate on α.
Thus, viewing the process from the u-axis, from Equation 3.11, we have
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
eα′ − 1
[
eα
′ − α′ − 1
]
. (B.15)
That is,
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
eR(α) − 1
[
eR(α) −R(α)− 1
]
, (B.16)
or more explicitly
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L [exp (
∫ α
0 λ(x)dx)−
∫ α
0 λ(x)dx− 1]
exp (
∫ α
0 λ(x)dx)− 1
.
It may be useful to verify the approach leading to Equation B.15 from another
angle. Combining Equation 3.7 and 3.11 gives for the homogeneous Poisson case,
E
[
Q(N)
]
= L− Lα
τα
.
Since L is not a time quantity, it need not be transformed. Thus the only factors
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that need to be transformed here are α and τα, giving for the non-homogeneous
Poisson case
E
[
Q(N)
]
= L− Lα
′
τ ′α′
.
From Equations B.6 and B.7 this gives
E
[
Q(N)
]
= L− LR(α)
eR(α) − 1 = L
[
1− R(α)
eR(α) − 1
]
.
which again yields Equation B.16. This indicates that the above approach that
concentrates only on the conversion of α and the arrival rate will yield correct results.
That is, since the income is measured in monetary terms, it should be the same irre-
spective of which time scale is used, and consequently only time-related parameters,
such as the length of the inactivity window and the arrival rate, need to be adjusted.
In the case when λ(t) = a+ bt, we have
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
[
eaα+bα
2/2 − aα− bα2/2− 1
]
e(aα+bα2/2) − 1
We see that as b→ 0, λ→ α, and the above tends to
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
eaα − 1 [e
aα − aα− 1] ,
which is in agreement with Equation 3.11. In the case when λ(t) is given by
Equation B.4, we have
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L [exp (
∫ α
0 Ae
ωxdx)− ∫ α0 Aeωxdx− 1]∫ α
0 Ae
ωxdx− 1
=
ωL× exp
[
A
ω
(eωα − 1)− A
ω
(eωα − 1)− 1
]
A (eωα − 1) .
We see that as ω → 0, λ→ A, and the above tends to
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
eAα − 1
[
eAα − Aα− 1
]
,
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which is in agreement with Equation 3.11. In the case when λ(t) is periodic as
given by Equation B.13, we have from Equation B.16
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
Le(A1/ω)[sin(ωα−φ)+sinφ]+A0α − (A1/ω) [sin(ωα− φ) + sinφ]− A0α− 1
e(A1/ω)[sin(ωα−φ)+sinφ]+A0α − 1
We see that as A1 = 0, then λ = A0, and the above tends to
E
[
Q(N)
]
=
L
eA0α − 1
[
eA0α − A0α− 1
]
,
which, again, is in agreement with Equation 3.11.
B.3 Algorithm III: Fixed Time Forward Auctions
with Fixed Inactivity Window and Maximum
Threshold Termination
Consider the Poisson stream. From (Van Micghem, 2006), the probability density
function of the inter-arrival time f(t) of this stream is
f(t) = Λ(t) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
Λ(x)dx
)
= pλ(t)e−pR(t). (B.17)
The average auction duration by combining the averages of (i) having an arrival
from Λ(t) in the interval (0, T ), and (ii) having no arrival from Λ(t) in the interval
(0, T ), and making use of Equation B.2 for the Λ(t) stream, is
E [TM ] =
∫ T
0
tf(t)dt+ T exp
(
−
∫ T
0
Λ(x)dx
)
. (B.18)
That is,
E [TM ] = p
∫ T
0
tλ(t)e−pR(t)dt+ Te−pR(T ). (B.19)
As for the auction income, we consider the process on the u-axis, so that from
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Equation 3.15, and noting that Λ(t) becomes p on the u-axis (since λ(t) is transformed
to unit arrival rate),
E [QM ] =
(M + L)
(
1− e−pT ′
)
2
+
Me−pT
′
(1− p)T ′
(
(1− p)T ′ + e−(1−p)T ′ − 1
)
.(B.20)
Since T ′ = R(T ), this becomes
E [QM ] =
(M + L)
(
1− e−pR(T )
)
2
+
Me−pR(T )
(1− p)R(T )
(
(1− p)R(T ) + e−(1−p)R(T ) − 1
)
.(B.21)
B.4 Algorithm IV: Variable Time Forward Auc-
tions with Fixed Inactivity Window and Max-
imum Threshold Termination
From Chapter 3, and carrying out the above time transformation, we have for the
average auction duration in the t-axis
E [τM ] = R
−1
{
1− e−α′
p+ p′e−α′
}
. (B.22)
For the average auction income we have, following the same arguments as in
Chapter 3,
E [Q′M ] =
1
p1 + p2
{
p1M
[
1− p
′α′
ep′α′ − 1
]
+
p2(M + L)
2
}
. (B.23)
B.5 Algorithm V: Auctions on Attaining a Given
Number of Bids
As indicated in Equation B.2, the mean number of bids for the non-homogeneous
Poisson process is given by R(t). Thus the average time τB required to attain B bids
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is given by
R (τB) =
∫ τB
0
λ(x)dx = B. (B.24)
Thus,
τB = R
−1(B). (B.25)
For λ(t) = a+ bt, we have
R (τB) =
∫ τB
0
(a+ bx)dx = aτB +
bτ 2B
2
= B. (B.26)
This gives
τB =
−a+√a2 + 2bB
b
(B.27)
If b → 0, λ(t) → a, and the above tends to B/a, which is in agreement with the
homogeneous Poisson case.
For
λ(t) = Aeωt (B.28)
we have
∫ τB
0
Aeωxdx =
AeωτB
ω
− A
ω
= B, (B.29)
which gives
τB =
1
ω
loge
(
ωB
A
+ 1
)
. (B.30)
Since the number of bids is the same, the auction income for this case is the same
as for the corresponding homogeneous Poisson case.
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B.6 Algorithm VI: Fixed Time Vickrey Auctions
To determine the average income E
[
Q(N(T ))−1
]
for the present situation, we remove
the condition on N(t) in Equation 3.8 using the probabilities given in Equation B.2
with t = T ; i.e.
E
[
Q(N(T ))−1
]
=
∞∑
N(T )=1
(N(T )− 1)L
N(T ) + 1
× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
=
∞∑
N(T )=1
[
L− 2L
N(T ) + 1
]
× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
=
∞∑
N(T )=1
L× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
−
∞∑
N(T )=1
2L
N(T ) + 1
× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
= L
(
1− e−R(T )
)
− 2Le
−R(T )
R(T )
∞∑
N(T )=1
R(T )N(T )+1
(N(T ) + 1)!
= L
(
1− e−R(T )
)
− 2Le
−R(T )
R(T )
(
eR(T ) − 1−R(T )
)
which simplifies to
E
[
Q(N(T ))−1
]
=
L
R(T )
(
R(T ) +R(T )e−R(T ) + 2e−R(T ) − 2
)
, (B.31)
i.e.
E
[
Q(N(T ))−1
]
=
L
(∫ T
0 λ(x)dx+
[∫ T
0 λ(x)dx× exp
(
− ∫ T0 λ(x)dx)]+ [2 exp (− ∫ T0 λ(x)dx)]− 2)∫ T
0 λ(x)dx
.(B.32)
B.7 Algorithm VII: Variable Time Vickrey Auc-
tions with Fixed Inactivity Window
The average auction duration is given in Section B.2. For the determination of average
auction income, as before, we carry out the time transformation in Equation B.6 so
that the parameter α in the t-axis will become α′ in the u-axis, and from Equation 4.6,
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we have
E
[
Q(N(T )−1)
]
=
2L
eα′ − 1 [sinhα
′ − α′] , (B.33)
i.e.
E
[
Q(N(T )−1)
]
=
2L
eR(α) − 1 [sinhR(α)−R(α)] . (B.34)
This gives
E
[
Q(N(T )−1)
]
=
2L [sinh
∫ α
0 λ(x)dx−
∫ α
0 λ(x)dx]
e
∫ α
0
λ(x)dx − 1
. (B.35)
B.8 Algorithm VIII: Fixed Time Vickrey Auctions
with Maximum Threshold Termination
The average auction duration is given in Section B.3. For the determination of average
auction income, as before, we carry out the time transformation in Equation B.6 and
using the unit arrival rate in the u-axis, we have from Equation 4.9,
E [QMv] =
(M + L)
(
1− e−pT ′
)
2
+
Me−pT
′
p′T ′
(
p′T ′ + p′T ′e−p
′T ′ + 2e−p
′T ′ − 2
)
,(B.36)
where
T ′ =
∫ T
0
λ(x)dx. (B.37)
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B.9 Algorithm IX: Variable Time Vickrey Auc-
tions with Fixed Inactivity Window and Max-
imum Threshold Termination
Here, we carry out the same transformation, and following similar arguments as
previously, we have for the average auction income,
E [Q′M ] =
1
p1 + p2
[
p1 (sinh (p
′α′) + p′α′) + p2
M + L
2
]
. (B.38)
The average auction duration here is the same as that given in Algorithm IV.
B.10 Algorithm X: Vickrey Auctions on Attaining
a Given Number of Bids
Here, the average magnitude of the accepted bid is given by Equation 4.13, while the
average auction duration is given by Equation B.25.
B.11 Algorithm XI: Fixed Time Reverse Auctions
Here, the auction duration is fixed and equals T . Following the techniques of previous
analysis, we have, for the average auction income
E
[
Q(1)
]
=
∞∑
N=0
L
N(T ) + 1
× e
−R(T )R(T )N(T )
N(T )!
=
Le−R(T )
R(T )
(
eR(T ) − 1
)
.
That is,
E
[
Q(1)
]
=
L
R(T )
(
1− e−R(T )
)
(B.39)
199
B.12 Algorithm XII: Variable Time Reverse Auc-
tions with Fixed Inactivity Window
Similar to previous approach, from Chapter 4, we have for the auction income
E
[
Q(1)
]
=
LR(α)
eR(α) − 1 . (B.40)
The average auction duration is similar to that obtained for Algorithm II.
B.13 Algorithm XIII: Fixed Time Reverse Auc-
tions with Minimum Threshold Termination
The average auction duration is similar to that obtained for Algorithm III. Carrying
out the same transformation as before, the average magnitude of the accepted bid
E [Qm], from Chapter 4, is
E [Qm] = L−
(2L−m)
(
1− e−pT ′
)
2
+
(L−m)e−pT ′
p′T ′
[
p′T ′ + e−p
′T ′ − 1
] .(B 41)
B.14 Algorithm XIV: Variable Time Reverse Auc-
tions with Fixed Inactivity Window and Min-
imum Threshold Termination
Following the same approach as previously, the average magnitude of the accepted
bid E [Qm] is, from Chapter 4,
E [Qm] = L−
e−α′
[
(L−m)
(
1− p′α′
e−p′α′−1
)]
+ 2L−m
2
(
1− e−pα′
) (
p+ p′e−α
′)
e−α′ + (1− e−pα′) (p+ p′e−α′)
 .(B.42)
where p = m
L
. The average auction duration is similar to that obtained for Algo-
rithm IV.
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B.15 Algorithm XV: Reverse Auctions on Attain-
ing a Given Number of Bids
Here, as before, the average auction duration required to attain B bids is the same
as Algorithm V, while the auction income is the same as for the corresponding non-
homogeneous Poisson case.
B.16 Empirical Representation of eBay arrivals us-
ing Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process
From the eBay auction data in Appendix A, some degree of non-uniformity seems to
exist in the bid arrival pattern within individual auctions. Thus, the non-homogeneous
Poisson process may be usefully employed to represent some of these situations.
For example, for Auction A2, we can represent the arrival pattern as (using day
as the time unit and counting the number of bid arrivals in each 24-hour period):
λ(1) = 8;λ(2) = 3;λ(3) = 2;λ(4) = 1;λ(5) = 1;λ(6) = 1;λ(7) = 4, the rates of
which show considerable variation and range from 1 to 8. Also, for Auction A3, we
can represent the arrival pattern as λ(1) = 2;λ(2) = 3;λ(3) = 1;λ(4) = 4;λ(5) = 8,
which shows a comparable degree of variability over each 24-hour period as Auction
A2.
Thus, modelling some Internet auctions using the non-homogeneous Poisson pro-
cess will offer a greater degree of versatility and flexibility, especially those with more
lengthy durations.
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